accomplishing it should be achieved.” 10. Article 34 indicates that ‘[t]he Member States agree that equality of opportunity, the elimination of extreme poverty, equitable distribution of wealth and income and the full participation of their peoples in decisions relating to their own development are, among others, basic objectives of integral development. To achieve them, they likewise agree to devote their utmost efforts to accomplishing the following basic goals: […] i) Protection of man's potential through the extension and application of modern medical science; […] l) Urban conditions that offer the opportunity for a healthful, productive, and full life.” 11. In turn, Article 45 states that “[t]he Member States, convinced that man can only achieve the full realization of his aspirations within a just social order, along with economic development and true peace, agree to dedicate every effort to the application of the following principles and mechanisms: […] h) Development of an efficient social security policy.” 10 12. In sum, the OAS Charter does not recognize the right to health, much less define its content. Therefore, and as I have stated on other occasions, to conceive Article 26 of the Convention as a norm of remission for all of the ESCER that are included in the OAS Charter disregards the commitment adopted by the States Parties and opens a path of uncertainty with respect to the catalogue of justiciable rights before the Court, affecting the legitimacy of its actions. 13. The majority claims that the Court has recognized in various cases the right to health as a right protected through Article 26, which is certainly not a reason in favor of its application – and that with respect to the consolidation of this right there exists “a broad regional consensus since it has been explicitly recognized in various constitutions and domestic laws in the region.” 11 14. We should stop and think about this argument, because it would appear that it purports to equate the Convention with the constitutions of the States Parties, as if one and the others were equal pieces of that so-called “regional consensus.” This is erroneous, both with respect to the nature of both types of instruments, as well as with respect to their scope, because the Convention is an international treaty, signed by the respective States while the constitution of each country is an agreement reached by the citizenry after domestic democratic deliberative processes. Its scope is also different; while the Convention is called to rule on the international adjudicatory plane, the respective constitutions have a domestic scope, circumscribed to each State. 15. Moreover, that reasoning implicitly converts the constitutions of the States Parties into a source of conventional law. This is an erroneous interpretation of Article 29(b) of the Convention. That precept is meant for cases in which a right, recognized in the Convention, is regulated more broadly by the legislation of a State Party. In that assumption, what must be applied -by virtue of the principle pro persona- is the most favorable norm in the specific case. The purpose of this provision is, of course, not to broaden the catalogue of conventional rights, as understood by this supposed homologation of the Convention and the national constitutions framed in the idea of a “regional consensus.” 16. It is necessary, therefore, to distinguish the two planes -related- but distinct. 10 11 Emphasis added. Cf. Para. 58. 3