B.2. Considerations of the Court 24. The Court recalls that paragraph 144 of the judgment states the following: Regarding the compensation for pecuniary damage, under the concept of loss of earnings, the Court recalls that a resolution of February 9, 2005, appointed the official who would permanently assume the function exercised by the victim at the time of his removal. Consequently, the corresponding calculation must be adjusted to this circumstance. Therefore, based on the period over which compensation should be paid for loss of earnings (from January 21, 2003, to February 9, 2005), and based on the amounts corresponding to the remuneration of officials with equivalent functions to that exercised by the victim at the time of the facts, the same figure appearing in the evidence provided by both parties, the Court orders the payment of the sum of US$25,000.00 (twenty-five thousand United States dollars) for loss of earnings in favor of Julio Casa Nina. 25. The representative requested clarification on whether the amount that was set included “pension entitlements” for the “affected years,” as well as “employment rights, “such as AFP (Pension Fund Administrators), ONP (Office of Pension Normalization), and others.” 26. With regard to this request, the Court recalls that, consistent with the nature of compensation for pecuniary damage for lost income or lost profits, the amount that was set included all the intrinsic or derived benefits of that employment relationship during the corresponding period. This follows from the concept of set compensation itself, and no further clarification is needed. Therefore, the representative’s request is rejected. C. The State's request for interpretation regarding the legal modifications ordered as a guarantee of non-repetition C.1. Arguments of the parties and of the Commission 27. The State requested clarification of paragraphs 136 to 139 of the judgment, as well as the seventh operative paragraph, with respect to the legal modifications ordered as a guarantee of non-repetition. It addressed three issues in its request. First, it asked for clarification on “the purpose and implications of the State modifying its domestic law with the aim of guaranteeing stability for provisional prosecutors,” since “it is not completely clear,” as “it can make adjustments at the regulatory, legislative, or constitutional levels,” so “it is necessary [...] to know [...] which type of legal modification” would constitute compliance with the order. 28. Second, Peru noted that in the event of a public competition for candidates, even though there is a specific timeline, for a variety of reasons there might not be an exact date for filling the position with an incumbent, including in cases in which the competition is suspended or declared unsuccessful. Thus, “it ask[ed] for clarification on what would constitute compliance with the judgment in those scenarios.” 29. Finally, the State requested interpretation of paragraph 139 of the judgment, regarding “the scope of the concept of conventionality review with respect to the obligation to make domestic legal modifications.” In this regard, it noted that the judgment, according to the concurring and partially dissenting opinion of one of the judges, “can be contradictory because on one hand, [...] it states that the legal framework can be interpreted as being consistent with the C[onvention], and on the other, an express modification of the same [laws] is demand[ed].” 6