13 71. In turn, in their closing written arguments, the representatives asserted that “the particulars detailed by the [alleged victims] in the brief of requests, arguments, and evidence, refer[red] to the facts mentioned in a general way in the application filed by the Commission.” Furthermore, the representatives considered that at the public hearing “the State acknowledged the facts contained both in the application of the Inter-American Commission and in the brief of requests [and] arguments.” 72. Moreover, in their closing written arguments, the representatives pointed out that the “facts referred to by the State as new are the events associated with Wilson García-Asto’s confinement in Yanamayo Prison [, in Puno (hereinafter “Yanamayo Prison”)] and Challapalca,” in the department of Tacna (hereinafter “Challapalca Prison”) and that in their brief of requests and arguments they had included alleged violations of rights established by the Convention other than the violations alleged by the Commission in its application (supra para. 2). 73. With regard to the events of the instant case, the Court has already established that the parties “may argue violations of the Convention other than those alleged by the Commission, as long as such legal arguments are based upon the facts set out in the application” in order to explain, clarify or dismiss the facts contained in the application, or to answer the applicant’s claims.4 However, supervening facts which occurred or were known after the main pleadings and briefs of the proceedings (the application, the brief of requests and arguments, and the answer to the application) had been filed, may be argued at any stage of the proceedings before final judgment is delivered.5 74. Furthermore, the Court has pointed out that the representatives of the alleged victims and/or their next of kin may argue violations of the Convention other than those alleged by the Commission in its application.6 To that respect, the Court has considered that the alleged victims are “the holders of all of the rights enshrined in the Convention; thus, preventing them from advancing their own legal arguments […] [to claim new rights] would be an undue restriction upon their right of access to justice, which derives from their condition as subjects of international human rights law.7 Nevertheless, the Court has expressly noted that, with regard to rights claimed for the first time by the representatives of the alleged victims and/or their next of kin, the legal arguments “[must be] based upon the facts set out in the application.”8 Moreover, the Court has applied the iura novit curia principle “which international jurisprudence has repeatedly used in the sense that the judge has the power and even 4 Cf. Case of the ““Mapiripán Massacre””, supra note 2, para. 57; Case of Moiwana Community, supra note 1, para. 91; and Case of De La Cruz-Flores. Judgment of November 18, 2004. Series C No. 115, para. 122. 5 Cf. Case of the ““Mapiripán Massacre””, supra note 2, para. 57; Case of Moiwana Community, supra note 1, para. 91; and Case of the De La Cruz-Flores, supra note 4, para. 122. 6 Cf. Case of the “Mapiripán Massacre”, supra note 2, para. 57; Case of Gutiérrez-Soler. Judgment of September 12, 2005. Series C No. 132, para. 53; and Case of the Girls Yean and Bosico, supra note 1, para. 181. 7 Cf. Case of the ““Mapiripán Massacre””, supra note 2, para. 57; Case of Gutiérrez-Soler, supra note 6, para. 53; and Case of Acosta-Calderón. Judgment of June 24, 2005. Series C No. 129, para. 142. 8 Cf. Case of the ““Mapiripán Massacre””, supra note 2, paras. 57 and 59; Case of Gutiérrez-Soler, supra note 6, para. 53; and Case of the Girls Yean and Bosico, supra note 1, para. 181.