the threat sufficient to affect the willingness of the individual," which they argued did not occur in this case.34 The record shows that the testimony given during the oral trial cannot be analyzed by the IACHR, as the corresponding transcript only shows the questions asked to each of the witnesses and not their responses. With regard to additional relevant information in the record of the oral trial, it can be noted that: (i) in view of the previous ruling and the fact that both parties proposed Brisa as a witness, it was ordered that neither of the parties be present during the victim's testimony, "noting for the record that she will not be called to testify further in order to not re-victimize her," and the parties were ordered to leave the courtroom during her testimony; 35 (ii) although the prosecutor had asked for the accused to submit to a psychosocial examination, he refused to do so;36 (ii) at the end of the hearing, the accused asked forgiveness for the abuse of the complainants’ trust, but insisted that there was never any rape or threats.37 According to the alleged victim’s description, during the time she had to wait to testify—one week, every day from 8 a.m. to 6 p.m.—she was kept in a small office in which she had to sit on the floor and was surrounded by other witnesses for the accused, who made comments about her, insulted her, harassed her, and threatened her.38 The State did not dispute this fact. n. At the end of the trial, the Court ruled unanimously, applying the principle of iura novit curia, that the accused was guilty of the crime of aggravated estupro, pursuant to articles 309 and 310 subparagraph 3, of the Bolivian Criminal Code in force at the time of the facts and sentenced him to seven years in prison.39 The grounds of the judgment indicate that, based on the principle of immediacy, the Court reached the conclusion that the accused had sexual relations multiple times "with his minor cousin […] taking advantage of the absence of the minor's parents from the home and that they had placed in him all the trust given to a close relative," and that to have the sexual relations, the accused "took advantage of his status as an adult to trick and seduce her to make the relationship appear consensual;”40 It also indicated that "the sexual relations took place between an adult and an adolescent, and they therefore cannot be described as perfectly symmetrical in the sense that the minor's consent is valid," concluding that in this case, there was "an asymmetric power relationship that corrupts any consent by the victim" and that, in order to keep having sexual relations with his cousin, the accused made use of "an array of trickery and seduction."41 Likewise, the judgment expressed its conviction "regarding the trickery and psychological manipulation" to which the teen was subjected and that the "dishonest psychological manipulation undermined Brisa De Angulo’s capacity for volition to resist the sexual abuse of which she was the target;”42 However, it stated that it had not been convincingly demonstrated that physical violence 43 or intimidation44 were used, and considering the "strong personality"45 of the victim, concluded that "it is not First oral trial. First criminal proceeding, pages 242-243. First oral trial. First criminal proceeding, page 228vta. 36 First oral trial. First criminal proceeding, page 230. 37 First oral trial. First criminal proceeding, page 243vta. 38 Additional Comments on the Merits, Brisa Liliana de Angulo, August 7, 2017, pg. 13; Statement of Brisa Liliana De Angulo, December 9, 2011, document attached to the petition before the IACHR of January 20, 2012, Annex 1, pg. 10. 39 First oral trial. First criminal proceeding, page 243vta. 40 Resolution No. 03/2003, Case No. 301199200300358. Trial Court No. 4 of the Capital Judicial District of Cochabamba. March 28, 2003 (“Judgment”). First criminal proceeding, page 246vta. 41 Judgment. First criminal proceeding, page 247. 42 Judgment. First criminal proceeding, page 247vta. 43 The Court defined physical violence as "the use of material force as an effective measure for overcoming a victim's opposition to sexual intercourse, suppressing their will. This generally involves real resistance from the victim that is ‘serious and ongoing’ [...] because a simple refusal is not sufficient to allow that the alleged victim experienced coitus after being overcome by the force of the actor […] This is different from the case of the woman who, after resisting as much as she can, understands the uselessness of her efforts and gives in, unquestionably a scenario of rape," Judgment. First criminal proceeding, page 248. 44 The Court indicated that "intimidation involves the exercise of moral violence in the form of the threat of greater, serious, imminent, forthcoming, or actual harm to the victim or a third-party associated with her; the threat must be ideal, credible, and aimed at obtaining flawed consent from the passive victim for the subsequent defilement […] However, it is necessary to assess in each case the possible effectiveness of the threat with regard to all the circumstances, especially regarding the personality of the victim," Judgment. First criminal proceeding, page 248. 45 This determination was based both on the testimony of the girl during the trial, who described herself as a “‘free thinker’ who enjoys knowledge very much and since a young age had received sex education from her parents," as well as the testimony from her father describing her as "a very autonomous person with a great aptitude for communication, sweet with anyone, and since she was very little, [continues …] 34 35 7