27 meant that this measure was ineffective as a mechanism to deal with exceptional situations. During General Stroessner’s dictatorship, judicial guarantees and bodies were ineffective and promoted the generalized impunity of human rights violations. Concerning “Operation Condor”12 61(5) Most of the Southern Cone’s dictatorial governments assumed power or were in power during the 1970s,13 and this permitted the repression of the so-called “subversive elements” at the inter-State level. The ideological basis of all these regimes was the “national security doctrine,” which regarded leftist movements and other groups as “common enemies,” whatever their nationality. Thousands of citizens of the Southern Cone sought to escape repression in their country of origin, taking refuge in bordering countries. The dictatorships therefore created a common “defense” strategy. 61(6) This was the context of the so-called “Operation Condor,” a code name given to the alliance of the security forces and intelligence services of the Southern Cone dictatorships in their repression of and fight against individuals designated “subversive elements.” The activities deployed as part of this Operation were coordinated basically by the military personnel of the countries involved. The Operation systematized and improved clandestine coordination between the “security forces and military personnel and intelligence services” of the region, which had been supported by the Central Intelligence Agency (the CIA), among other United States agencies.14 The system of codes and communications had to be efficient for “Operation Condor” to function, and so that the lists of “most wanted subversives” could be managed easily by the different States.15 61(7) Regarding the dynamics of “Operation Condor”, documents from the “Terror Files” reveal the different meetings of political, military and intelligence authorities of the countries involved and the way in which the operation was assembled:16 12 Paragraphs 61(5) to 61(8) “on ‘Operation Condor’” correspond to facts that are found to have been proved based on the following documents: the book Es mi informe. Los archivos secretos de la Policía de Stroessner, supra note 11; the book Testimonio contra el Olvido; Reseña de la Infamia y el Terror, supra note 11; the book En los sótanos de los generales. Los documentos ocultos del Operativo Cóndor, Alfredo Boccia Paz, Miguel H. López, Antonio V. Pecci and Gloria Jiménez Guanes, Ed. Expobook and Servibook, 2002, and sworn statement made by the expert witness Alfredo Boccia Paz on May 25, 2006 (file of statements made before or authenticated by notary public). 13 Uruguay, 1973; Chile, 1973; Argentina, 1976; Brazil, 1964; Bolivia, 1971; Paraguay, 1954, and Peru, 1968 and 1975. 14 Cf. sworn statement made by the expert witness Alfredo Boccia Paz, supra note 12, folios 6313 and 6314. 15 Cf. sworn statement made by the expert witness Alfredo Boccia Paz, supra note 12, folio 6316. 16 This quotation is taken from the book, Es mi informe, supra note 11, pp. 253 to 276. Es mi informe is the first complete study published following the finding of the “Terror Archives,” prepared by experts of the Paraguayan Centro de Documentación y Estudios. The Center was responsible for classifying and organizing the documents and its work made it possible to establish the Centro de Documentación y Archivo para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos, the official custodian of the “Terror Archives” today. Several extracts from Es mi informe mention “filing cabinets” (archivadores), which refer to the physical space occupied by the “Terror Archives,” from which the respective document is taken.