the Merits Report, prior to the submission of the case to the Court and months after the judgment of January 31, 2011, had been delivered, the State responded to the Commission’s request for information on compliance with its recommendations as follows: “it should be noted that the said [three] proceedings were conducted in accordance with national and international standards, at all times ensuring the rights of the parties and other procedural principles and guarantees, thus the State is complying with its obligations concerning the investigation and determination of those responsible for the facts in question.” Lastly, the State presented updated information on this criminal proceeding because, by that time, the second instance ruling against the Air Force servicemen had also been confirmed. Some days later, on July 19, 2011, the State sent a final brief to the Commission with similar information.210 148. Thus, both the representatives and the Inter-American Commission acted in the proceedings before the latter based on that position adopted by the State and, under those terms, the Commission prepared the Merits Report and, subsequently, submitted the case to the Court. In accordance with the principles of estoppel,211 good faith, procedural equality and legal certainty, the State cannot make such substantial changes in the position it took before the Inter-American Commission by now presenting a hypothesis about the events based on a ruling delivered in the context of a criminal proceeding that, by a decision of the State itself, was not subject to discussion during the processing of the case before the Commission. Consequently, the said decision of the Criminal Court of the Arauca Specialized Circuit of January 31, 2011, invoked by the State, cannot be considered a supervening or complementary fact, not only because the State was aware of it before the Commission issued Merits Report 61/11 of March 24, 2011 (despite which, it did not provide any information on it at that time or when it was notified of the report), but principally because the proceeding in which this ruling was delivered does not form part of the factual framework of the case.212 149. In any case, it is not incumbent on the Court to analyze the alleged shortcomings of the said judgment of January 31, 2011, or rule on an alleged new “aspect that violates Articles 8 and 25 of the Convention to the detriment of the victims,” as the representatives request. The Court observes that the said judgment was handed down in a proceeding in which the death of the Santo Domingo were victims during the events that occurred on December 13, 1998, were not the result of a “homemade bomb” as initially stated in the documents in the case file, but rather of a combat device, known as a cluster bomb, dropped from the FAC-4407 helicopter, and that the presumed perpetrators of the act are the latter’s crew ….” Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, of December 14, 2006 (evidence file, tome 5, folios 2504). 210 In particular, it indicated the following: “[t]he State, once again wishes to indicate that it has been complying with its obligations at the domestic and the international levels through its different judicial instances. In Colombia, in criminal matters , proceedings have been held to determine those presumably responsible for the events that occurred on December 13, 1998. In the criminal jurisdiction, the 12th Criminal Court of the Bogotá Circuit had initially delivered a guilty verdict […]. The State reiterates that the different jurisdictions have acted free of any obstruction and suspicion. As revealed in the different briefs and evidence submitted at this stage. It also recalls that the decisions of the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, the ordinary criminal jurisdiction, and the disciplinary jurisdiction comply with both domestic and international standards.” Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, of July 19, 2011 (evidence file, tome 6, folios 2753 and 2757). 211 As established in its case law, this Court considers that a State that has adopted a certain position which produces legal effects cannot then, based on the principle of estoppel, assume another conduct that is contradictory to the former and that changes the status of the facts used by the other party to guide its actions. The principle of estoppel has been recognized and applied in both general international law and in international human rights law. In this regard, see Case of the Río Negro Massacres v. Guatemala, para. 25, and Case of Neira Alegría et al. v. Peru. Preliminary objections. Judgment of December 11, 1991. Series C No. 13, para. 29. 212 On December 28, 2005, the State had advised that, as of May 30, 2000, the Human Rights Unit of the Prosecutor General’s Office had ordered the procedural separation of the case into two proceedings (on the one hand, against members of the FARC with regard to the murder of eight members of the Armed Forces and, on the other, with regard to possible adverse effects on the civilians of Santo Domingo caused by members of the Army). Cf. Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, of December 27, 2005 (evidence file, tome 5, folios 2212 and 2213, 2224). Even if it is considered that, after this, the Commission was aware that another investigation existed, the State gave no relevance to the said criminal proceeding against “alias Grannobles” for the purposes of the instant case. Consequently, the Commission made scant mention of it the merits report, which reaffirms the conclusion that the said proceeding, irrespective of its results, was not in keeping with the factual framework of the instant case, so that it is not a supervening fact either. For the same reason, and in view of the relevance that the State is now trying to give to the said ruling, neither can this be considered an additional piece of information that would now complement facts that are in keeping with the purpose of the case. Therefore, no further analysis of the said proceeding will be made in this Judgment. ‐ 44 ‐