said device in light of the principle of proportionality, because an analysis of this type would involve determining whether the deceased and injured among the civilian population could be considered an “excessive” result in relation to the specific and direct military advantage expected if it had hit a military objective, which did not occur in the circumstances of the case. c) The principle of precaution in attack 216. According to international humanitarian law, the principle of precaution in attack refers to a customary rule for both international and non-international armed conflicts which establishes that “[i]In the conduct of military operations, constant care must be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects,” and that “[a]ll feasible precautions must be taken to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.” 313 Similarly, rule 17 of customary international humanitarian law stipulates that “[e]ach party to the conflict must take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of warfare with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects,” and rule 18 indicates that “[e]ach party to the conflict must do everything feasible to assess whether the attack may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”314 217. Based on the evidence in the case file, the Court observes, first, as noted in the judgment of the 12th Criminal Court of the Bogotá Circuit,315 and as revealed by the ballistic tests carried out in Apiay (supra para. 63) that the AN-M1A2 device, developed in the 1940s,316 is not a precise weapon, 317 and its launch mechanism is operated manually by means of a cord that is pulled when the pilot gives the order.318 In addition, it is worth recalling that the device is composed of six bombs (supra para. 63) that separate from the cluster when the device is launched,319 and that this type of device falls due to the effects of gravity.320 In this regard, as proved by the Apiay tests (supra para. 63), there can be differences of various dozens of meters between the points of 313 Henkaerts, Jean – Marie, Doswald – Beck Louise, Customary International humanitarian law, volume I, rules, ICRC, Cambridge, 2005, Rule 15. 314 Henkaerts, Jean – Marie, Doswald – Beck Louise, Customary International humanitarian law, volume I, rules, ICRC, Cambridge, 2005, Rules 17 and 18. 315 Cf. 12th Criminal Court of the Bogotá Circuit. Judgment of September 24, 2009, p. 64 (evidence file, tome 2, folio 364). 316 Cf. Technical manual for the AN-M1A2 explosive device (evidence file, tome 19, folio 10074). 317 Cf. Ballistics Report No. 128288 of September 3, 2003, Prosecutor General’s Office, Job number BF 1241/2003 Procedure 419 (evidence file, tome 40, 21284). 318 Superior Court of Bogotá, Criminal Chamber, Judgment of June 15, 2011 (evidence file, tome 20, folio 10800). “Regarding the manual launch of the device, carried out by H.A., […] it should be underlined that, based on the contribution of the procedural elements that were transcribed, his effort was limited to merely operating the safety mechanism that freed the cluster, on hearing the pilot C.R.P. say ‘three, two, one, now.’” See also: Video of the 2003 test at Apiay, minutes 38:55 to 40:12 (evidence file, tome 19, folio 9584). In the video, the procedure and the functioning of the device is explained and, also it can be seen that the device is located on the right; there are two phases in the launch of the device (first, the pilot says “ready’ and the technician must respond saying “ready,” then the pilot says “now”), then the technician must operate a red handle, which is the one that must be pulled in order to free the hooks that support the bomb. 319 Cf. Technical Manuals of the AN-M1A2 explosive device, p. 6 (evidence file, tome 19, folio 10056). See also: Ballistics Report No. 128288 of September 3, 2003, Prosecutor General’s Office, Job number BF 1241/2003, Procedure 419 (evidence file, tome 40, folio 21271). 320 Cf. Testimony of Captain R.G.G., Colombian Air Force pilot who took part in Operation “Relámpago,” before the National Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Unit. Case file 419 of December 19, 2003 (evidence file, tome 12, folios 6139), and Statement made by el Captain L.R.Q. (Technical training commander and pilot of the Colombian Air Force) before the Attorney General’s Office (evidence file, tome 12, folio 6168). ‐ 65 ‐