14 admits evidence to the contrary. The same seeks to conclude that a missing person or a person there has been no news of, after a certain period of time has gone by without having any evidence of their whereabouts or fate, is presumed dead. 46. A presumption of this type must have at least the following elements in order to be made: a) there must be a fact or state of the situation, b) the non-existence of evidence that would allow to infer that said state of the situation is not so, c) the existence of a rule of presumption regarding the mentioned fact or state of the situation, and d) the conclusion of the presumption that can be reached after said analysis. Thus, to be analyzed in a comprehensive manner during this stage of the proceedings, the Court should consider and assess certain facts stated in the application that form part of the merits of the case, the non-existence of evidence that can prove the contrary, and the existence of a rule of presumption of death, in order to finally reach the conclusion established in the presumption. 47. Likewise, the Tribunal observes that the rules of presumption generally invert the burden of proof of certain facts in favor of any of the parties in the proceedings, when due to the absence of conclusive evidence the fact established in the presumption cannot be declared, this in order to reach legal certainty in the litigation of a case regarding the facts under analysis. In the case of the presumption of death due to forced disappearance, the burden of proof falls upon the party that had the alleged control over the detained person and their fate –generally the State-, who must prove the fact contrary to what is concluded from said presumption, that is, that the person has not died. 48. In this sense, it would be inadmissible that the party on which the burden to invalidate the presumption falls use it in order to exclude or limit, in an early manner through a preliminary objection, the Tribunal’s jurisdiction over certain facts in a case of forced disappearance. On the contrary, the State would be using the presumption of death to once again invert the burden of proof on who argued it for the first time, that is the Commission and the alleged victims. The use of a presumption in this manner makes its existence ineffective and invalidates the sense of its existence within the law. 49. In any case, the Court warns that the presumption of death in cases of forced disappearance only leads to the conclusion that it be presumed that Mr. Rosendo Radilla died, but it does not lead to a certain determination or approximation of the exact date on which his death occured, which would be essential in order to accept the State’s request. 50. Based on all the aforementioned, this Tribunal dismisses the present preliminary objection and it declares itself competent to analyze the facts that would allegedly violate Articles 4 and 5 of the American Convention in detriment of Mr. Radilla-Pacheco. IV JURISDICTION 51. The Inter-American Court is competent to hear the present case, in the terms of Article 62(3) of the Convention, given that Mexico is a State Party to the American Convention since March 24, 1981 and it acknowledged the Court’s contentious jurisdiction on December 16, 1998. Likewise, the State ratified the CIDFP on April 9, 2002. V PARTIAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY