89 remain in complete impunity.” The Commission did not present arguments in this sense. The State, on its part, indicated that “[i]t understands and shares the position of the [representatives], in the sense that there are still matters that deserve to be examined and that shall be reformed in order to achieve a greater serving of justice. However, it has been proven that Mexico has effective laws in force that help to serve justice in matters of all types, including, of course, criminal ones.” In this regard, it indicated that the crime of forced disappearance of persons “is punished by the Federal Criminal Code” since June 1, 2001. Therefore, it requested that the Court declare “[t]hat a conviction for violations to Article 2 of the Convention is not admissible.” 316. In the previous chapter it was established that the only mention of an alleged responsible made by the Special Prosecutors’ Office was for the crime of “illegal deprivation of liberty in its modality of plagiarism or kidnapping” and not for the crime of forced disappearance of persons in force in Mexico (supra para. 238). This decision has had negative consequences on the effectiveness, diligence, and exhaustiveness of the investigations and on the determination of the corresponding individual responsibilities (supra paras. 238 through 240). In this regard, the Tribunal recalls that, according to that indicated by the State, the application of the legal classification of forced disappearance of persons in this case was not possible since it “requires that the active subject of the crime be a public official, but when the legal classification came into force the defendant Francisco Quiros [sic] Hermosillo went into retirement.” (supra para. 236) 317. The Court has repeatedly established that the States Parties to the American Convention have the general duty to adjust their domestic legislation to the provisions of that treaty in order to guarantee the rights enshrined in it (supra para. 144).306 In the case of the forced disappearance of persons, this obligation is corresponded with Article I d) of the CIDFP, which stipulates that the State Parties to the same undertake to take legislative, administrative, judicial, and any other measures necessary to comply with the commitments undertaken by them. 318. Specifically, the obligation to adopt domestic measures implies that the States shall define the crime of forced disappearance, and Article III of the CIDFP is expressed in this sense. The Court has established that the description of the crime of forced disappearance of persons shall be done taking into consideration Article II of the mentioned Convention, which establishes a minimum standard regarding its correct legal classification within the domestic legal system.307 The Article in question stipulates that: For the purposes of this Convention, forced disappearance is considered to be the act of depriving a person or persons of his or their freedom, in whatever way, perpetrated by agents of the state or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support, or acquiescence of the state, followed by an absence of information or a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the whereabouts of that person, thereby impeding his or her recourse to the applicable legal remedies and procedural guarantees. 319. The Court warns that the crime of forced disappearance is punished in Article 215-A of the Federal Criminal Code since the year 2001, in the following terms: 306 Cf. Case of “The Last Temptation of Christ” (Olmedo Bustos et al.) v. Chile. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of February 5, 2001. Series C No. 73, para. 87; Case of Heliodoro Portugal v. Panama, supra note 24, para. 179, and Case of Anzualdo Castro v. Peru, supra note 44, para. 161. 307 Cf. Case of Heliodoro Portugal v. Panama, supra note 24, para. 189.