79 jurisdiction to investigate and, in its case, prosecute and punish the authors of violations of human rights275 but that instead the processing of those responsible always corresponds to the ordinary justice system.276 In that sense, the Court, on multiple occasions, has indicated that “[w]hen the military jurisdiction assumes competence over a matter that should be heard by the ordinary jurisdiction, it is violating the right to a competent tribunal and, a fortiori, to a due process,” which is, at the same time, intimately related to the right to a fair trial.277 The judge in charge of hearing a case shall be competent, as well as independent and impartial.278 274. Therefore, taking into account the constant jurisprudence of this Tribunal (supra paras. 272 and 273), it shall be concluded that if the criminal acts committed by a person who enjoys the classification of active soldier does not affect the juridical rights of the military sphere, ordinary courts should always prosecute said person. In this sense, regarding situations that violate the human rights of civilians, the military jurisdiction cannot operate under any circumstance. 275. The Court points out that when the military courts hear of acts that constitute violations to human rights against civilians they exercise jurisdiction not only with regard to the defendant, which must necessarily be a person with an active military status, but also with regard to the civil victim, who has the right to participate in the criminal proceedings not only for the effects of the corresponding reparation of the damage but also to exercise their rights to the truth and to justice (supra para. 247). In that sense, the victims of the violations of human rights and their next of kin have the right to have said violations heard and resolved by a competent tribunal, pursuant with the due process of law and the right to a fair trial. The importance of the passive subject transcends the sphere of the military realm, since juridical rights characteristic of the ordinary regimen are involved. 276. The Tribunal points out that, during the public hearing (supra para. 69), the expert Miguel Sarre Iguíniz warned on the extension of military jurisdiction in Mexico and stated that Article 57, fraction II, subparagraph a) of the Code of Military Justice “[is beyond the] written [and] closed scope […] of military discipline […],” besides the fact that “[n]ot only is it more ample regarding the active subject, but it is more ample because it does not consider the passive subject […].” Similarly, the expert Federico Andreu-Guzmán, in the statement offered before the Tribunal (supra para. 68), stated that among the elements characteristic of the Mexican military criminal jurisdiction was “[a]n extensive realm of material competence, which surpasses the framework of strictly military crimes,” and that “[t]hrough the figure of the crime of duty or with occasion of the service enshrined by Article 57 of the Code of Military Justice, the Mexican criminal jurisdiction has the characteristics of a personal jurisdiction linked to the defendant’s condition of soldier and not to the nature of the crime.”279 275 Cf. Case of the Massacre of La Rochela v. Colombia, supra note 83, para. 200 and Case of Escué Zapata v. Colombia, supra note 56, para. 105. 276 Cf. Case of Durand and Ugarte v. Peru, supra note 274, para. 118; Case of La Cantuta v. Peru, supra note 51, para. 142; and Case of the Massacre of La Rochela v. Colombia, supra note 83, para. 200. 277 Cf. Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru, supra note 54, para. 128; Case of Palamara Iribarne v. Chile, supra note 274, para. 143, and Case of Tiu Tojín v. Guatemala, supra note 24, para. 118. 278 Cf. Case of Ivcher Bronstein. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of February 6, 2001. Series C No. 74, para. 112; Case of 19 Tradesmen, supra nota 274, para. 167, and Case of Escué Zapata v. Colombia, supra note 56, para. 101. 279 Cf. Statement issued by Mr. Federico Andreu-Guzmán before notary public (affidavit) on June 22, 2009 (dossier of merits, volume IV, folio 1319).