b) Test of proportionality 104. With respect to the second point, the Court has affirmed that it is the responsibility of the judicial authority to apply a test of proportionality when ordering the deprivation of liberty. The Court has viewed pre-trial detention as a precautionary and not a punitive measure, 75 which must be applied exceptionally as it is the most severe measure that may be imposed on the accused, who enjoys the right to the presumption of innocence. 76 In turn, the Court has previously held that the deprivation of liberty of a suspect or of a person accused of an offense “cannot be based on general preventive or special preventive purposes, which could be attributed to the punishment.” 77 Consequently, the Court has stressed that the general rule should be that the accused is at liberty while his criminal responsibility is being resolved. 78 105. In view of the above, the judicial authority can only impose measures of this nature when it ensures that: a) the purpose of the measures that deprive or restrict liberty are compatible with the Convention; b) the measures adopted are appropriate to meet the purpose sought; c) they are necessary in the sense that they are absolutely essential to achieve the purpose sought and that, among all possible measures, there is no less burdensome one in relation to the right involved, that would be suitable to achieve the proposed objective and d) they are strictly proportionate so that the sacrifice inherent in the restriction of the right to liberty is not exaggerated or excessive compared to the advantages that are obtained from this restriction and the achievement of the purpose sought. 79 106. With respect to the first point, the Court has indicated that the measure may only be imposed when necessary to satisfy a legitimate purpose; in other words, that the accused will not impede the development of the investigation and that he will not evade justice. 80 It has likewise emphasized that the procedural danger must not be presumed, but must be verified in each case, based on the objective and true circumstances of the specific case. 81 The necessity of those purposes is based on Articles 7(3), 7(5) and 8(2) of the Convention. 107. The Court notes that Article 7(5) establishes that “[a]ny person detained shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to be released without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings. His release may be subject to guarantees to assure his appearance for trial.” The sense of this norm is that the measures that deprive liberty during criminal proceedings must be conventional and must always have a precautionary purpose; in other words, that they are a means to neutralize procedural risks; in particular, the norm refers to the purpose related to appearance in the proceedings. 82 108. Article 8(2), for its part, sets forth the right to the presumption of innocence, according to which a person is considered innocent until proved guilty. This guarantee ensures that the elements that prove the existence of the legitimate purposes are not based on an assumption, but rather the 75 Cf. Case of López Álvarez v. Honduras. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of February 1, 2006. Series C No. 141, para. 69 and Case of Romero Feris v. Argentina, supra, para. 97. Cf. Case of Tibi v. Ecuador, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 7, 2004. Series C No. 114, para. 106 and Case of Hernández v. Argentina, supra, para. 106. 76 Cf. Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v. Ecuador, supra, para. 103 and Case of Villarroel Merino et al. v. Ecuador. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 24, 2021. Series C No. 430, para. 83. 77 78 89. Cf. Case of López Álvarez v. Honduras, supra, para. 67 and Case of Villarroel Merino et al. v. Ecuador, supra , para. 79 Cf. Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v. Ecuador, supra, para. 93 and Case of González et al. v. Venezuela, supra, footnote 113. Cf. Case of Suárez Rosero v. Ecuador. Merits. Judgment of November 12, 1997. Series C No. 35, para. 77; Case of Amrhein et al. v. Costa Rica, supra, para. 356 and Case of González et al. v. Venezuela, supra, para. 98. 80 81 Cf. Case of Amrhein et al. v. Costa Rica. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of April 25, 2018. Series C No. 354, para. 357; Case of Barreto Leivav v. Venezuela, supra, para. 115 and Case of González et al. v. Venezuela, supra, para. 102. 82 Cf. Case of Amrhein et al. v. Costa Rica, supra, para. 357 and Case of González et al. v. Venezuela, supra, para. 100. 26