considers that the domestic authorities should impose alternative measures to pre-trial detention so that that its exceptional nature is not undermined. 91 c) Duty to provide an adequate rationale for measures that deprive liberty 113. With regard to the third point, the Court has held that any restriction to liberty that does not have a sufficient justification (Art. 8(1)) that would permit an assessment as to whether it meets the aforementioned conditions will be arbitrary and, therefore, would violate Article 7(3). In order that the presumption of innocence (Art. 8(2)) be respected when precautionary measures that restrict liberty are ordered, the State must clearly substantiate and prove, depending on each specific case, the existence of the aforementioned conventional requisites. 92 To proceed otherwise would be tantamount to anticipating the sentence, which would contravene generally recognized principles of law, among them, the right to the presumption of innocence. 93 114. The Court has, also, taken the position that pre-trial detention must be subjected to periodic review so that it is not prolonged when there no longer exist the reasons that gave rise to its adoption. 94 The Court has specifically stated that a judge does not have to wait for an acquittal for detainees to regain their liberty, but rather the judge must periodically assess whether the rationale, the necessity and the proportionality of the measure remain and whether the period of deprivation of liberty has gone beyond the limits imposed by law and by reason. Whenever it appears that a pretrial detention does not meet these conditions, release must be ordered, without prejudice to the continuation of the respective proceedings. The Court recalls that it is the national authorities who are responsible for evaluating the appropriateness of maintaining the precautionary measures that they issue pursuant to their legal norms. In doing so, the national authorities must provide sufficient grounds that would allow the interested parties to know why the restriction to their liberty is being maintained, which in order not to be considered an arbitrary deprivation of liberty and to ensure that it is compatible with Article 7(3) of the Convention, it must be based on the need to guarantee that the detainee will not impede the efficient conduct of the investigation or evade the action of justice. Likewise, when a request is received for the release of a detainee, the judge must at least minimally substantiate (Art. 8(1)) the reasons for maintaining the pre-trial detention. In any case, even when there are reasons for keeping a person in pre-trial detention, the period of deprivation of liberty should not exceed a reasonable time (Article 7(5) of the Convention. 95 B.2. On the compatibility of arraigo and pre-trial detention with the American Convention 115. The representatives and the Commission argue that the arraigo found in Article 12 of the Federal Law of 1996 and in Article 133 bis of the Federal Code of 1999, norms that were applied in the present case, are not compatible with the Convention since they infringe the rights to personal liberty, the presumption of innocence and the obligation to adopt provisions of domestic law (Arts. 7, 8(2) and 2). The representatives arrived at similar conclusions with respect to pre-trial detention. Thus, these laws should be analyzed to determine whether they contravene the rights to personal liberty and to the presumption of innocence. Cf. Case of Bayarri v. Argentina, supra, para. 70, Case of Amrhein et al. v. Costa Rica, supra, para. 361 and Case of Montesinos Mejía v. Ecuador. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of January 27, 2020. Series C No. 398, para. 112. 91 Cf. Case of Argüelles et al. v. Argentina. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 20, 2014. Series C No. 288, para. 120; Case of Women Victims of Sexual Torture in Atenco v. Mexico, supra, para. 251 and Case of González et al. v. Venezuela, supra, footnote 114. 92 93 Cf. Case of Suárez Rosero v. Ecuador. Reparations and Costs. Judgment of January 20, 1999. Series C No. 44, para. 77; Case of Argüelles et al. v. Argentina, supra, para. 131 and Case of Romero Feris v. Argentina, supra, para. 110. Cf. Case of Bayarri v. Argentina, supra, para. 74; Case of Women Victims of Sexual Torture in Atenco v. Mexico, supra, para. 255 and Case of González et al. v. Venezuela, supra, para. 99. 94 95 Cf. Case of Argüelles et al. v. Argentina, supra, paras. 121 and 122 and Case of Romero Feris v. Argentina, supra, para.111. 28