right to personal liberty (Art. 7) and the right to the presumption of innocence (Art. 8(2)) to the detriment of Jorge Marcial and Gerardo Tzompaxtle Tecpile and Gustavo Robles López. DONE b) Pre-trial detention 158. The representatives argue that pre-trial detention sua sponte contravenes various provisions of the Convention. The Court notes that this institution was not applied in the present case and, therefore, it will not consider it. Pre-trial detention is currently found in different domestic laws in Mexico (supra paras. 42 to 46). These provisions of domestic law have varied across the years. 132 When the events occurred in the present case, the Federal Code of 1999 referred to pre-trial detention in its Articles 161 and 168 (supra paras. 43 and 44). It was not until 2011 that the so-called pre-trial detention sua sponte was introduced into the legal order in Mexico (supra para. 45). In this section, the Court will center its analysis on the pre-trial detention that was applied in the present case. 159. The Court recalls that, from April 22, 2006 to October 16, 2008, the victims were deprived of liberty under pre-trial detention and that the judicial decision that ordered its application was based on Articles 161 and 168 of the Federal Code of 1999. 133 (supra paras. 43 and 44). 160. According to Article 161 of the Federal Code of 1999, “an order of formal detention shall be decreed within seventy-two hours of the accused being placed at the disposal of a judge, when the following requisites have been met: I. That the accused has given a preliminary statement in the manner and under the standards established in the preceding chapter or the record shows that he has refused to give a statement; II That it is demonstrated that the alleged offense provides for the deprivation of liberty; III. That, with respect to the prior clause, the probable guilt of the accused is demonstrated and IV. That there is no circumstance that would fully exonerate the accused from responsibility or that would quash the criminal proceedings.” 161. In turn, Article 168 of the Federal Code of Criminal Procedure of 1999 established, and continues to state, that “the Public Prosecutor’s Office shall indicate the corpus delicti involved and the probable responsibility of the accused as the basis for criminal proceedings. The judicial authority, in turn, shall examine whether both requirements are vouched for in the record. The corpus delicti is the combination of objective or external elements that make up the substance of a matter that the law expresses as an crime, as well as the norms, should the classification so require. The probable responsibility of the accused shall be proven when the existing evidence indicates participation in the crime, the intentional or unintentional commission of the crime and the lack of any indication of a legal cause or any reason to exclude his guilt. The corpus delicti and the probable responsibility shall be demonstrated by any evidentiary means set out in the law.” 162. With respect to this institution, the Court notes that Article 161 refers solely to the concurrence of the substantive assumptions; in other words, to the imprisonable offense and the participation of the accused. The norm does not refer to the purposes of pre-trial detention nor to the procedural dangers that are sought to prevent, nor the requirement of an analysis of the necessity of the measure in view of the less harmful measures for the rights of the accused, such as the alternative measures to deprivation of liberty. In this context, the only circumstances that the courts may take into account when considering the imposition of this precautionary measure is that an extenuating circumstance of responsibility or the extinction of responsibility has been found. The Court likewise notes, in relation to the last point, that the norm requires an elevated standard of evidence to consider proved the extinction or exemption of responsibility, requiring that this be fully proven so that the pre-trial detention is not ordered; not be to considered, for example, the need to assess the concurrence of attenuating circumstances of responsibility nor the state of development of the offense. Therefore, as it is conceived, pre-trial detention does not have a precautionary purpose and becomes an anticipated punishment. 132 See, for example, expert opinion of Luis Raúl González Pérez, offered at the public hearing. Cf. Judicial Branch of the Federation. Resolution of the Judge of the Third District for Federal Criminal Proceedings of April 22, 2006 (evidence file, f. 14821 et seq.). 133 38