3 the members of the Moiwana Community in relation to the traditional territories from which they were expelled, and provide for the members’ use and enjoyment of those territories. These measure shall include the creation of an effective mechanism for the delimitation, demarcation, and titling of said traditional territories, in terms of paragraphs 209-211 of this Judgment.” (operative paragraph n. 3). 10. I understand that the determination of the delimitation, demarcation, titling and return of the communal lands constitutes a legitimate and necessary form of non-pecuniary reparation, in the circumstances of the cas d’espece, which the InterAmerican Court has full authority to order, in accordance with article 63(1) of the American Convention. It is not only a matter of restitutio, returning to the vulnerable statu quo ante of the victimized community, but also ensuring the guarantee of non-repetition of the harmful and especially grave events (the 1986 massacre). II. The Guarantee of a Voluntary and Sustainable Return. 11. In the case of the members of the communities subjected to violence as a whole, like the Moiwana Community, the lack of compliance with the aforementioned form of reparation would imply a violation of the principle of non-discrimination. The delimitation, demarcation, and titling of the Community’s lands become of fundamental importance, also to guarantee a sustainable return. Here once again the convergence between International Human Rights Law and International Refugee Law (as well as International Humanitarian Law), which I have been supporting for many years 1 , are manifest. 12. Since return - evidently voluntary – was not dealt with by the Convention on the Statute of Refugees of 1951 nor by its Protocol of 19672, the specialized doctrine has given considerable attention to the question in the last few years, in order to address the new needs of protection of the human being.3 In Latin America, the issue has not passed unnoticed by the Declarations of Cartagena (1984), San José of Costa Rica (1994) and Mexico (2004), regarding refugees and displaced persons. I have closely accompanied this historic process, and also participated in it, and I am of the conviction that the Inter-American Court cannot remain indifferent or insensitive to it. Cf., for an acutalization of my thesis on this topic, A.A. Cançado Trindade, "Aproximaciones y Convergencias Revisitadas: Diez Años de Interacción entre el Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos, el Derecho Internacional de los Refugiados, y el Derecho Internacional Humanitario (De Cartagena/1984 a San José/1994 y México/2004)", in Memoria del Vigésimo Aniversario de la Declaración de Cartagena sobre los Refugiados (1984-2004), 1st. ed., San José of Costa Rica/Mexico, UNHCR, 2005, pp. 139-191. 1 Although the termination clauses have do with it. The Convention of the OAU Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa of 1969 continues to be the only treaty that deals explicitly with the question of voluntary return. 2 Cf., e.g., inter alia, A.A. Cançado Trindade and J. Ruiz de Santiago, La Nueva Dimensión de las Necesidades de Protección del Ser Humano en el Inicio del Siglo XXI, 3rd. ed., San José of Costa Rica, UNHCR, 2004, pp. 17-1212. 3