SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE A.A. CANÇADO TRINDADE 1. I have voted in favor of the adoption of this Order on provisional protection measures of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in Mery Naranjo et al. v. Colombia; however, I feel obliged to attach this separate opinion with my brief reflections on some concerns that I have been expressing to the Court in recent months, with a view to strengthening this preventive mechanism for the safeguard of human rights. I refer, in particular, to some difficulties that have emerged from this practice under the American Convention, arising from the co-existence of the precautionary measures of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the provisional measures of the Inter-American Court, in light of the imperative of ensuring the individual’s direct access to the international instances. Constrained by the merciless pressure of time, I will now present my brief reflections lex lata and lege ferenda in this regard. I. Brief reflections lex lata. 2. In its original request to the Court of July 3, 2006, for provisional measures in the case of Mery Naranjo et al., the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights mentioned the “ineffectiveness” of its own precautionary measures in this case.4 The situation of the beneficiaries of the measures had deteriorated, to the point that the Commission finally decided to request the Court to order provisional protection measures. This has occurred in numerous other cases in which the Commission insisted in ordering its precautionary measures and only later, when the situation of the petitioners had exacerbated, submitted requests for provisional measures to the Court in extremis. The well-know cases relating to the death penalty in Trinidad and Tobago (e.g., James et alii), among many others, are classic examples of this situation. 3. In recent joint meetings between the Inter-American Court and Commission as well as in numerous public hearings before the Court, and in the Court’s deliberations, I have expressed my profound concern regarding this practice and have indicated that, in certain cases, it would be better to send requests for provisional protection measures directly to the Court without the Commission previously insisting on its precautionary measures. The situation is even worse when the Commission refuses to order precautionary measures for the petitioners without providing sufficient justification for its decision, since the petitioners are unable to resort to the Court, because their cases are pending before the Commission rather than before the Court. 4. I consider that such cases could constitute a denial of the right to international justice. Hence, I wish to record my position in this regard in this separate opinion, since I perceive the approach of the twilight of my time as a judge of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (tempus fugit). I do so with a view to enhancing this important preventive protection mechanism of the American Convention, while recording my vote of confidence in the common sense of my colleagues of both the Inter-American Court and Commission. . 4 Part V.III, paragraph 40.