sufficient motivation to allow for an evaluation of whether it meets the conditions described will be arbitrary and, therefore, a violation of Article 7(3) of the Convention. 49 76. The preventive detention ordered for Mr. Carranza was based on Article 177 of the CCP, which authorized the legal authorities to order it only on the basis of indications of a crime punishable by deprivation of liberty and indications of the “guilt” or “complicity” of the “defendant” (supra para. 37). 50 77. The legal decision that ordered Mr. Carranza’s preventive detention stated that “[b]ecause the conditions set forth in Article 177 of the CCP are met, the orders for preventive detention are confirmed.” Even though the same action referred to the fact that Mr. Carranza was a fugitive, it did not discuss it as support for the decision to use preventive detention, but rather for the purpose of his capture or apprehension. 51 78. Regarding Article 177 of the CCP, this Court has already determined that: it left in the hands of the judge the decision on pretrial detention based solely on the assessment of “indicia” regarding the existence of a crime and its authorship, without considering its exceptional nature, or its use based on strict necessity and the possibility that the accused could hinder the process or evade justice. The decision to automatically impose preventive deprivation of liberty based on the type of crime prosecuted is contrary to [conventional] guidelines, which require proof, in each specific case, that the detention is strictly necessary and that its purpose is to ensure that the accused will not impede the development of the proceedings or evade justice. […] In view of the foregoing, this Court [found] that article [...] 177 [...] was contrary [...] to the international standard established in its constant case law regarding preventive detention. 52 79. The Court notes the State's argument, presented before this Court, that preventive detention was “necessary by virtue of the fact that [Mr. Carranza] was a fugitive” (supra para. 59). However, that is an allegation the State made in the trial before this Court, not an argument clearly documenting the proceedings that ordered the preventive detention. Said proceedings supported the preventive detention ruling in which the circumstances required by Article 177 of the CCP were presented. As stated above, “[a]ny restriction on liberty that does not have sufficient motivation to allow for an evaluation of whether it meets the conditions [previously] described [for the appropriateness of preventive detention] will be arbitrary,” in violation of Article 7(3) of the Convention (supra para. 75). 80. Therefore, the statements made by this Court in the case of Herrera Espinoza et al. v. Ecuador are relevant for the present case: The Court notes the State’s argument that the defendant's flight [...] proved the need for preventive detention in the case. However, even when it could eventually be possible to determine that there were 49 77. Cf. Case of García Asto and Ramírez Rojas v. Peru, para. 128, and Case of Jenkins v. Argentina, para. In the same vein, the expert Fonte Carvalho asserted that within the “legal framework in effect between 1983 and 2000,” the “bases” for ordering preventive detention were “indications of a crime meriting a sentence of deprivation of liberty, as well as indications that the defendant is a perpetrator or accomplice to the crime being tried. If the crime being tried merited a sentence not longer than one year of prison and [if] the defendant has not been sentenced previously, the Judge should refrain from ordering preventive detention.” 50 The text of the legal order states “as [Mr. Carranza and one other person] are fugitives, local [p]olice authorities are hereby ordered capture them.” 51 52 Case of Herrera Espinoza et al. v. Ecuador, paras. 148, 149, and 150. In the same judgment, paragraph 153 states the conclusion that shows the violation of Article 2 of the Convention. 19