123. Second, this Court notes that the court that took the final decision on the responsibility of Scot Cochran was a collegiate court composed of three judges, and LGBG was only one of them. Therefore, the fact that one member of the collegiate court decided the appeal on the extension of a precautionary measure of deprivation of liberty did not necessarily violate judicial guarantees,164 particularly when, in this case, the adverse judgment was adopted unanimously. Moreover, no questions have been raised before this Court, nor can they be seen in the evidence provided in the domestic remedies, in relation to the impartiality of OWW and AMD, the other two judges who composed the court. Furthermore, it has not been argued or proved that LGBG was able to influence the vote of the other two judges. 124. The Court also notes that, even though the possibility of filing a challenge was available at the time of the facts, this was not filed against Judge LGBG during the criminal proceedings that culminated in the adverse judgment. Moreover, the representatives did not indicate the reason why this mechanism was not used. In addition, during the domestic proceedings, the argument of lack of impartiality was not alleged in the remedy of cassation, or in the first two appeals for review, or in any of the constitutional appeals; rather, it was submitted for the first time during the third review procedure on February 10, 2012.165 This remedy was examined and decided by the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice and, in its ruling, it found that there was no suspicion of partiality because there was no evidence that the judge had assessed the body of evidence when deciding the appeal against pre-trial detention.166 125. Based on the arguments set out above, the Court considers that the guarantee of an impartial judge was not violated in this specific case. However, it notes that, mutatis mutandis, this is the same situation noted in Amrhein et al. v. Costa Rica in relation to the participation of judges in courts in charge of determining the criminal responsibility of the accused, when those judges have already acted in the adoption and review of precautionary measures of deprivation of liberty. Although the relevant laws were not examined in Amrhein et al. v. Costa Rica, or in this case, in light of the situation, the State should take the necessary measures to further strengthen the guarantee of an impartial judge.167 126. Consequently, the Court finds that the State did not violate the right to an impartial judge established in Article 8(1) of the American Convention, in relation to its Article 1(1), to the detriment of Scot Cochran. 164 Cf. Case of Amrhein et al. v. Costa Rica, supra, para. 391. Cf. Third review procedure filed by Scot Cochran on February 10, 2012, against judgment No. 851-04 delivered by the Criminal Trial Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José on August 17, 2004 (evidence file, folios 213 to 231). 165 Cf. Ruling No. 2013-00211 of the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of February 15, 2013, deciding the third review procedure (evidence file, folios 38 to 40). 166 In its recent case of Tzompaxtle Tecpile et al. v. Mexico, this Court stated that the adoption of a precautionary measure that restricts personal liberty, such as pre-trial detention, does not have an impact on the responsibility of the accused because “it should be taken by a different judge or judicial authority from the one that finally takes the decision on the merits of the case”; this gives greater assurance to the guarantee of an impartial judge and the presumption of innocence. Case of Tzompaxtle Tecpile et al. v. Mexico, supra, para. 102, mutatis mutandis Case of Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of July 2, 2004. Series C No. 107, para. 174, and Case of Romero Feris v. Argentina. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of October 25, 2019. Series C No. 391, para. 95. 167 36