7 disregard for a right, but also potentially ascribing liability to the State. In this regard, it stressed that the facts were committed by private individuals and not by agents of the State. It also contended that “the petitioners are trying to get the organs of the Inter-American system to act as a fourth instance to local courts.” The State further claimed that the IACHR cannot adjudicate facts that have not been proven in the domestic jurisdiction and that the IACHR could only act in cases of flagrant violation of due process, which is not the situation in this particular case. 31. The State argued that the IACHR’s decision to join analysis of admissibility and merits is out of order. It contended that said decision is unwarranted and that it has precluded it from exercising its right of defense. 32. As to the merits of the matter, the State recognized that “the paramilitary groups enticed some of the members of the public security forces with whom they conducted isolated joint military operations (…) mistakenly calling themselves self-defense forces.” It contended that, nonetheless, the existence of paramilitary forces cannot be attributed to the State and the “unfortunate and isolated collusion of some of the members of the security forces” cannot be regarded as a State policy. 33. The State asserted that when acts involving paramilitary groups occur, “the participation, collaboration, acquiescence or collusion of agents of the State” must be proven “concretely and directly in each act alleged to be a violation.” It argued that the alleged acts in this case were executed exclusively by the Self-Defense Forces of Magdalena Medio as retaliation for the abduction of a paramilitary leader and that no link to agents of the State has been proven in a court of law. It also contended that, since such a link has not been proven, the elements of authorization, support or acquiescence, as set forth in the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons (IACFDP), are not present. 34. The State also alleged that the petitioners made general claims without individually examining each disappearance case separately. It contended, therefore, that the State cannot be held responsible for violations of Articles 4, 5 and 7 of American Convention. The State provided greater detail about one of the incidents that was part of the subject matter in the instant case. It noted that on June 26, 1996, the FTA carried out Operation Lightning Bolt (Operación Rayo) “in order to arrest or take out terrorists of the EPL (People’s Liberation Army) gang,”5 and not one single person was even injured in the operation. It argued that there is stark contradiction between sworn statements. As to the validity of statements provided by Ramón Isaza, the State held two positions. On the one hand, it regarded statements that the acts were carried out exclusively by members of the paramilitary forces as valid evidence, while statements linking members of the military to the acts were stripped of their evidentiary value and it noted that judicial verification of such claims was pending. It also asserted that should the statement that bodies were dumped into different rivers prove to be true, “recovery of the mortal remains of these persons would be impossible.” 35. As for the analysis of the duty of prevention, the State asserted that the responsibility of the State is contingent upon knowledge of a real and imminent danger and a reasonable chance to prevent or help to avoid said danger. It contended that the petitioners did not make the State aware of a real and imminent danger of each individual. On the contrary, the State claimed that it involved 5 The People’s Liberation Army (EPL) is a Colombian guerrilla group which began operating in the late seventies, mainly in the region of Antioquia.