68 Court finds it proved that Gladys Carol Espinoza Gonzáles was unable to communicate with her family until approximately three weeks after her detention. 182. In addition, the Court recalls that Gladys Espinoza was arrested and detained without a court order and without judicial control for at least 30 days (supra para. 137). The conditions in which her arrest and detention were carried out lead to the conclusion that the facts that she alleges truly occurred. As it has on other occasions, 318 the Court observes that to reach a different conclusion would mean allowing the State to shield itself behind the negligence and ineffectiveness of the investigation, and the situation of impunity in which the facts of this case remain, in order to exempt itself from responsibility. B.2.8. Legal definition of the facts 183. Having established the facts, the Court will proceed to provide a legal definition for what happened during the initial detention of Gladys Espinoza on April 17, 1993, and during the time she spent on the premises of the DIVISE and the DINCOTE in April and May 1993. 184. First, the Court has indicated that any use of force that is not strictly necessary owing to the behavior of the person detained constitutes an affront to human dignity, in violation of Article 5 of the American Convention. 319 In this case, the State has not proved that the force used when arresting Ms. Espinoza Gonzáles was necessary; therefore the Court finds that the State violated her right to personal integrity recognized in Article 5(1) of the American Convention, in relation to Article 1(1) of this instrument. 185. Second, the Court recalls that an international legal regime has been developed concerning the absolute prohibition of all forms of torture, both physical and psychological, and, with regard to the latter, it has been recognized that the threat and real danger that a person will be subjected to severe physical injuries causes, in certain circumstances, a moral anguish of such a degree that it may be considered “psychological torture.” 320 The Court finds it evident that, given the context of violence at the time by both the subversive groups and State agents (supra paras. 51 to 68), the fact that unknown men arrested Ms. Espinoza while firing their weapons and that they beat her on the head, among other actions, in order to force her into a vehicle together with her partner, who was bleeding, and where she received death threats against herself and her family, and that she would be “infected with AIDS,” and heard that 20 men were going to “take advantage of her,” necessarily caused her feelings of intense anguish, fear and vulnerability. Thus, these facts constitute, also, a violation of her physical integrity, a form of psychological torture, in violation of Article 5(1) and 5(2) of the American Convention, in relation to Article 1(1) thereof, to the detriment of Gladys Espinoza. 186. Third, regarding the events that took place on the premises of the DIVISE and the DINCOTE, international human right law has established that incommunicado must be exceptional and that its use during detention may constitute an act that is contrary to human dignity, 321 because it may result in a situation of extreme psychological and moral suffering for the detainee. 322 Thus, starting with its first judgments, the Inter-American Court has considered that prolonged isolation and incommunicado represent, in themselves, forms of cruel and inhuman treatment, that are harmful to the mental and moral integrity of the individual and of 318 Cf. Case of Kawas Fernández v. Honduras. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of April 3, 2009. Series C No. 196, para. 97, and Case of J. v. Peru, supra, para. 356. 319 Cf. Case of Loayza Tamayo v. Peru. Merits, supra, para. 57, and Case of J. v. Peru, supra, para. 363. 320 Cf. Case of Cantoral Benavides v. Peru, supra, para. 102, and Case of J. v. Peru, supra, para. 364. 321 Cf. Case of Cantoral Benavides v. Peru. Merits, supra, para. 82, and Case of J. v. Peru, supra, para. 376. 322 Cf. Case of Suárez Rosero v. Ecuador. Merits, supra, para. 90, and Case of J. v. Peru, supra, para. 376.