71 193. The Court has also recognized that rape is an extremely traumatic experience that has severe consequences and causes great physical and psychological damage, leaving the victim “physically and emotionally humiliated,” a situation that it is difficult to overcome with the passage of time, contrary to what happens in the case of other traumatic experiences. 333 This reveals that rape inherently produces severe suffering for the victim, even when there is no evidence of physical injury or affliction. Indeed, the consequences of rape will not be bodily injuries or ailments in all cases. Women victims of rape also experience severe psychological, and even social, harm and aftereffects. 194. In the instant case, the Court has established that, during her detention in the DIVISE and the DINCOTE in April and May 1993, Gladys Espinoza was subjected to forced nudity and inappropriate touching, her breasts and pubic hair were pulled, and one of her assailants tried to put his penis in her mouth (supra para. 159). It is clear that, since they involved the presumed victim’s breasts and genital area, these acts constituted sexual violence. Regarding the “inappropriate touching” and the attempt to force her to have oral sex, the Court considers that these acts entailed the physical invasion of Gladys Espinoza’s body, 334 taking into account that the victims of sexual violence tend to use unspecific terms when making their statements and not to provide graphic explanations of the anatomical characteristics of what happened. 335 In this regard, the CVR indicated that “[t]he statements usually use unclear or ‘personal’ terms when describing the acts of sexual violence to which victims were subjected” and referred specifically to the use of the term “inappropriate touching” as one of the ways in which the victims described acts of sexual violence. 336 The Court has also established that, during the said period, Ms. Espinoza experienced vaginal and anal penetration by hand and, in the latter case, also by an object (supra para. 159), which constituted acts of rape. 195. Lastly, the Court considers it pertinent to recall, as already established in this case, that one of the forms of the generalized practice of torture was the generalized practice of sexual violence against women, in particular by State agents, and against women who were presumably involved in the armed conflict (supra paras. 62 to 66). The Court also recalls that special mention was made of the DINCOTE as a place where rape was perpetrated frequently (supra para. 159). In this regard, the Court finds that what happed to Ms. Espinoza is consistent with this generalized practice. Since they took place in this context, the Court considers that the acts of sexual violence against Gladys Espinoza also constituted acts of torture the absolute prohibition of which, it reiterates, belongs nowadays to the domain of international jus cogens (supra para. 141). 196. Based on all the above, the Court decides that the acts perpetrated against Gladys Carol Espinoza Gonzáles on the premises of the DIVISE and the DINCOTE constituted acts of torture, in violation of the obligations contained in Article 5(2) and 5(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights, in relation to Article 1(1) of this instrument, and failure to comply with the obligations established in Articles 1 and 6 of the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture. comparable gravity” and, in the case of war crimes, “any other form of sexual violence also constituting a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions.” Elements of Crimes describes rape as a crime against humanity of rape and a war crime. 333 Cf. Case of the Miguel Castro Castro Prison v. Peru, supra, para. 311, and Case of Rosendo Cantú et al. v. Mexico, supra, para. 114. Similarly, EHCR, Case of Aydin v. Turkey, No 23178/94. Judgment of 25 September 1997, para. 83. 334 In this regard, see, Case of J. v. Peru, supra, para. 347. 335 Cf. Case of J. v. Peru, supra, para. 360. 336 Cf. Informe Final de la Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Volume VI, Chapter 1.5, p. 364, and Case of J. v. Peru, supra, para. 347.