-114investigation; (d) determine the cause, method, place and moment of death, as well any pattern or practice that could have caused the death, and (e) distinguish between natural death, accidental death, suicide and murder. In addition, the scene of the crime must be searched exhaustively, autopsies carried out and human remains examined rigorously by competent professionals using the most appropriate procedures.233 178. The negligence of the judicial authorities responsible for examining the circumstances of the massacre by the opportune collection of evidence in situ, cannot be rectified by the belated probative measures to seek and exhume mortal remains in the San Antonio cemetery in Montería, and in other places, which the Prosecutor General’s Office reinitiated as of February 2003; namely, more than 13 years after the events had occurred. The flaws indicated may be classified as serious failures to comply with the obligation to investigate the facts, because they have negatively affected an effective or better identification of the bodies that were found and determination of the whereabouts of 37 of the 43 alleged victims who remain disappeared. 179. In addition, during the investigation, probative elements were furnished that indicated or referred to the possible participation of members of the Army; for example, a report of the Technical Corps of the Judicial Police dated January 29, 1990, the statements of witnesses and, in particular, those of Rogelio de Jesús Escobar Mejía (supra paras. 95(63), 95(70), 95(78), 65(a) to (d), and 66(a)). Nevertheless, as has been indicated, there is nothing in the body of evidence to show that any of the courts have summoned an Army officer to appear, or any reasons why such an appearance was not ordered subsequently (supra para. 95(85)). The decisions issued in 1993 by the Medellín Delegate Regional Prosecutor only ordered preventive detention measures against Fidel Castaño Gil and other alleged members of the paramilitary group and not against public officials. Even more relevant is the fact that on February 4, 1994, the Medellín Regional Directorate of the Prosecutor General’s Office abstained from considering the possible responsibility of members of the Armed Forces in the facts owing to “the jurisdiction to which they are subject because they were on active service, especially if they were in the so-called public order [units] that require permanent active service. The prosecutor has therefore decided that the criminal responsibility should be determined by an official of the military justice system” (supra para. 95(97)). 180. As of October 19, 1990, the investigation into Fidel Castaño Gil and others being conducted by the Fourth Public Order Court was transferred to the First Public Order Court to be continued in conjunction with the investigation the latter was conducting into the abduction of Manuel Alfonso Ospina Ospina, because it was considered that “the different criminal episodes had the same final motivation.” The Court does not consider that the joinder of the investigations for those facts, which occurred at very different times and in very different circumstances, helped improve results with regard to the clarification of the facts. 181. On May 26, 1997, the Medellín Regional Court delivered judgment in first instance, and convicted six individuals involved in the facts of Pueblo Bello for having 233 Cf. Case of the “Mapiripán Massacre”, supra note 7, para. 224; Case of the Moiwana Community, supra note 7, para. 149, and Case of Juan Humberto Sánchez, supra note 189, para. 127 and 132. Likewise, the United Nations Manual on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extralegal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions, Doc. E/ST/CSDHA/12 (1991).