22. In its report of March 26, 2010, the State advised that, according to the Ministry of the Interior, the transfers should be coordinated with the Assistant Director General of Operations to provide “security in the mountains,” and that security during exhumations should be coordinated with the local police station. It also indicated that it was “convening the beneficiaries in order to coordinate with them the protective measures that would be provided to them and to obtain a schedule of transfers and exhumations to be conducted in the near future.” 23. Subsequently, during the public hearing, the State confirmed that “to protect the team of forensic anthropologists,” the National Civil Police used the “mountain security” plan, which was coordinated by the Operations Division with the different police stations concerned, according to the territorial boundaries. This involved operating relays of radio patrol cars from the police station of each area to provide security and protection during transfers. The State indicated that, together with the beneficiaries of the measures, “an initial program or schedule of exhumation activities had been established; although, unfortunately, due to an interruption in the flow of information, this was only partially complied with because it only covered the exhumation in the La Verbena Cemetery in Zone 7 of Guatemala City on July 21, 2010”; furthermore, regarding the second schedule, “with the exception of the exhumation programmed in the Department of Jutiapa and the following ones, the protection services were provided coordinated by the Sub-Directorate General of Operations.” The State added that this security mechanism is not limited to custody during transfers, but rather “the police agents are required to protect the life, security and safety of the [FAFG] workers and experts, irrespective of the protection mechanisms ordered by the competent jurisdictional organ or the urgent actions required by the prosecutor of the case.” It also advised that, on April 5, 2010, a meeting had been held with the beneficiaries at which it was agreed to forward the exhumation schedules to the Presidential Coordinating Committee for the Executive’s Human Rights Policy (hereinafter “COPREDEH”) in order to coordinate the beneficiaries’ protection; but “it was not always possible to achieve the effective protection of the beneficiaries,” owing to the limited notice with which FAFG sent the schedule of activities. During the said public hearing, the State indicated that “it would be willing to coordinate [the] mechanism” proposed by the representatives for security during the exhumations (infra considering paragraph 25) “to ensure effective compliance with the provision.” Nevertheless, in its reports of September 22 and November 9, 2010, the State insisted that “the collaboration of the beneficiaries was necessary [to] forward the agreed schedule with sufficient notice: a minimum of one week before the first transfer,” so as to ensure the satisfactory operation of the security service for these procedures. Lastly, in its report of January 14, 2011, Guatemala advised that, in November 2010, the Ministry of the Interior had provided information “on the constraints to providing a full-time patrol car” to the FAFG employees for the exhumations, including “the scarcity of resources such as patrol cars, because these cars provide human and logistic support to different institutions every day.” In addition, it indicated that “while mechanisms that could be more effective are arranged,” it continued to provide the “mountain security” service. 24. The representatives indicated that the “mountain security” service represented an “obstacle to the work, because the mechanism consisted in changing the security unit (patrol car) according to territorial boundaries and the area of responsibility of the police station to which each police unit was assigned,” with the problem that agents were not always available, because they were not specifically appointed to provide security to the FAFG. The representatives considered that “this mechanism is not effective because there are no units that provide continuous protection throughout the journey.” 25. During the public hearing and in their subsequent observations, the representatives insisted that the mountain security system was “not functional, [because] the teams are 9