55. However, whenever one of the exceptions to the prior exhaustion requirement has been applied, the Commission will consider the date on which the alleged violation of rights occurred and the circumstances of each case to determine whether the petition was lodged within a reasonable period of time. 56. The exception that Article 46(2) of the Convention provides to the rule requiring exhaustion of local remedies applies in the present case and, based on the allegations made by the petitioner, the facts that are at issue in this petition began on July 1, 2003. The petition was lodged with the Commission on November 13, 2003. Taking the circumstances of the case into account, inter alia, the fact that two constitutionality challenges brought by the petitioner have yet to be decided, the Commission finds that the time period in which the present petition was lodged was reasonable. 3. Duplication of proceedings 57. Under Article 46(1)(c) of the American Convention, in order for a petition to be admitted, its subject cannot “be pending in another international proceeding for settlement.” Article 47(d) of the Convention stipulates that the Commission shall not admit a petition that is "substantially the same as one previously studied by the Commission or by another international organization." Neither of the parties to this case has alleged the presence of either of these two circumstances that would preclude admissibility, nor is there anything in the case file that would suggest this. 4. Characterization of the facts alleged 58. Article 47(b) of the Convention provides that the Commission shall declare any petition or communication to be inadmissible when it “does not state facts that tend to establish a violation of the rights guaranteed by this Convention.” The Commission believes that this phase of the proceedings is not the appropriate one to establish whether a violation of the American Convention is present. For admissibility purposes, the Commission must decide whether the petition states facts that tend to establish a violation of the Convention, as stipulated in Article 47(b) thereof, and whether the petition is “manifestly groundless” or “obviously out of order”, as provided in paragraph (c) of that article. 59. The standard for evaluating the factual requirements is different from the requirement for deciding the merits of a petition. The IACHR must conduct a prima facie evaluation to determine whether the petition establishes grounds for the apparent or potential violation of a right guaranteed by the Convention, but not to establish the existence of a violation. Such an evaluation does not imply prejudgment or advance an opinion on the merits. By establishing two distinct phases –one on admissibility and the other on the merits, the Commission’s Rules of Procedure reflect this distinction between the evaluation to be carried out by the Commission for the purpose of declaring a petition admissible and that required to establish whether a violation has taken place. 60. The Paraguayan State argued that the petition does not state any fact that tends to establish a violation of the rights guaranteed by the Convention and denied the charge that it had failed to respect the petitioner’s right to a fair trial, his right to have his honor respected and dignity recognized, or his rights to have access, under general conditions of equality, to the public service of his country, to equal protection and to judicial protection. The State’s contention is that the procedure, the authorities that set the impeachment trial in motion, and the grounds invoked to remove the petitioner as a Supreme Court justice were those prescribed by the Constitution.