It was this distinction, therefore, that allowed the Commission to proceed as it did; namely ruling not on the admissibility of the petition as it was lodged by the petitioner and in his terms, but according to the Commission’s understanding of the petition, and that allowed it, therefore, to declare it inadmissible as regards one aspect, and admissible as regards the other two, as if the latter were not an indivisible part of the former. For its part, although the Judgment notes that the Commission “submitted to the Court all the facts described in merits report No. 84/10,” 15 and despite recognizing that, at least up until the Admissibility Report, the complaint related to the criminal proceedings, 16 it follows the division made by the Commission as if this was a factual aspect of the case and not a methodological option, hence theoretical and questionable. By proceeding in this way, the Judgment did not rule on all the facts that had been submitted, but exclusively on the pertinent ones that had allowed the Commission to substantiate the partial admissibility of the petition. 17 In other words, taking this approach, the Judgment validated the contradiction in which the Commission had incurred when submitting to the Court all the facts of the case and, at the same time, asking it to rule exclusively on some of them. Thus, considering that it was only competent to rule on the latter, the Court also considered those facts, not as they had been submitted in the petition, but as elements that had taken place outside the criminal proceedings taken as a whole. 2. Rule of the prior exhaustion of domestic remedies From the articles of the Convention mentioned previously it can also undoubtedly be inferred that, for a petition to be admitted by the Commission, the requirement consisting in the prior filing and exhaustion of domestic remedies must have been met at the date of its presentation before the Commission, and not subsequently. This is because the corresponding provisions of the Convention establish, peremptorily, on the one hand that “[a]dmission by the Commission of a petition or communication […] shall be subject to the following requirements: […] that the remedies under domestic law have been pursued and exhausted,” 18 and, on the other hand, that “[t]he Commission shall consider inadmissible any petition […] if: […] any of the requirements indicated in Article 46 has not been met,” 19 which include the said requirement of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies. However, another fact of the instant case is that, at the date the petitioner lodged the petition before the Commission, that is October 12, 2005, the domestic remedies had not been exhausted. In fact, bearing in mind that it corresponds to the petitioner to request that his petition be exempted from the obligation of having previously exhausted the domestic remedies in order to be admitted, it must be understood that the said remedies were not exhausted when the pertinent petition was lodged. This is what occurred in the instant case. And this is expressly recognized in the petition itself, when it states that “[o]wing to the legal situation of the citizen Raúl Díaz Peña in 15 Para. 45. 16 Para. 122. 17 Paras. 55 and 121. 18 Art. 46(1)(a) of the Convention. 19 Art. 47 of the Convention. 4