20 protection of the rights of individuals is not limited to the immediate victim; it also includes relatives who, because of the events and particular circumstances of a given case, are the parties that exercise the right in the domestic system.15 This Court also held that “Article 8(1) of the Convention must be interpreted in an open way so that said interpretation be endorsed both in the literal text of the standard as well as in its essence.”16 59. The Court has also written that: based on Article 8 of the Convention it is understood that victims of violations of human rights, or their relatives, must be able to be heard and act on their respective proceedings, both looking for the clarification of facts and the punishment of the liable parties and a proper compensation.17 60. The Court has stated that the scope of Article 25(1) of the Convention includes the principle of the effectiveness of the procedural means or instruments created to guarantee those rights. The Court found that, under the Convention [S]tates Parties have an obligation to provide effective judicial remedies to victims of human rights violations (Art. 25), remedies that must be substantiated in accordance with the rules of due process of law (Article 8(1)), all in keeping with the general obligation of such States to guarantee the free and full exercise of the rights recognized by the Convention to all persons subject to their jurisdiction.18 61. From the facts admitted in the instant case, it is self-evident that the relatives of the victims did not have an effective remedy that would guarantee the exercise of their rights. One result was that the proceeding prosecuted in the military court and now the proceeding in the regular criminal courts, have failed to identify the responsible parties. 62. As for the time period of the criminal proceeding, Article 8(1) of the Convention speaks of “a reasonable time”. In the instant case, the parties made the relevant arguments. The Court points to its decision in the Judgment on preliminary objections of February 4, 2000, where it wrote that: The State has not provided a satisfactory explanation regarding the procedural measures between that date and the beginning of 1998. The State’s silence must be evaluated taking into account that, during the first seven years the procedural measures did not get beyond the investigation stage. Colombia has mentioned the progress that took place since the Human Rights Unit of the Office of the Prosecutor General took charge of the matter. But the issue in question is not what happened in 1998, but 15 Cf. Bámaca Velásquez Case, supra note 4, paragraph 196; Durand and Ugarte Case, supra note 4, paragraphs 128-130, and Blake Case, Judgment of January 24, 1998, Series C No. 36, paragraph 98. 16 Cf. Durand and Ugarte Case, supra note 4, paragraph 128, and Blake Case, supra note 15, paragraph 96. 17 Cf. Durand and Ugarte Case, supra note 4, paragraph 129, and Villagrán Morales et al. Case, supra note 4, paragraph 227. 18 Godínez Cruz Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of June 26, 1987. Series C No. 3, paragraph 93; Fairén Garbí and Solís Corrales, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of June 26, 1987. Series C No. 2, paragraph 90, and Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of June 26, 1987. Series C No. 1, paragraph 91.