110 Considerations of the Court 167. Paragraphs 1 and 4 of Article 22 of the American Convention establish that: 1. Every person lawfully in the territory of a State Party has the right to move about in it, and to reside in it subject to the provisions of the law. […] 4. The exercise of the rights recognized in paragraph 1 may also be restricted by law in designated zones for reasons of public interest. […] 168. This Court has pointed out that freedom of movement is an indispensable condition for free development of each person.229 The Court has concurred with the conclusion of the United Nations Human Rights Committee, in its General Comment No. 27, where it establishes that freedom of movement and of residence consist, inter alia, of the following: a) the right of those lawfully in the territory of a State to move about freely in that State and to choose their place of residence; and b) the right of each person to enter their country and remain in it. Enjoyment of this right does not depend on any specific objective or motive of the person who wishes to move about or to remain in a certain place.230 169. In the instant case, the representatives argued that the State breached Article 22(1) of the Convention to the detriment of the next of kin of the victims they represent, due to the domestic displacement they were forced to suffer. Based on the facts acknowledged by the State, the Court does in fact find that the freedom of movement of the families of the victims was curtailed while the paramilitary remained in Mapiripán during the facts of July 1997 (supra para. 96.35). Furthermore, it has been proven that many of the next of kin of the victims in Mapiripán were forced into displacement after the massacre (supra paras. 96.63 and 96.64). However, based on the circumstances of the instant case and given the complex situation of vulnerability that affects persons who suffer the phenomenon of forced internal displacement, the Court finds it necessary to analyze the dynamics of said phenomenon in the specific context of Colombia’s domestic armed conflict, before establishing whether in the instant case the State breached the Convention to the detriment of the next of kin due to this situation. 170. In the recent Case of the Moiwana Community v. Suriname, this Court deemed that, notwithstanding the existence of legislation on the matter by the respondent State, the freedom of movement and residence of the members of the Moiwana community who were displaced was limited by a de facto restriction stemming from the fear they felt for their security and from the fact that the State had not conducted a criminal investigation, which kept them away from their ancestral territory. The Court pointed out that the State had not established the necessary conditions or provided the means required to enable the members of the community to return voluntarily, safely and with dignity, to their traditional lands. Furthermore, the State had not conducted an effective criminal investigation to end 229 See Case of the Moiwana Community, supra note 4, para. 110, and Case of Ricardo Canese, supra note 185, para. 115. 230 See Case of the Moiwana Community, supra note 4, para. 110, and Case of Ricardo Canese, supra note 185, para. 115. United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment no. 27 of November 2, 1999, paras. 1, 4, 5 and 19.