17 on juridical aspects of the legal proceedings, as they are neither legal experts nor attorneys” and are, in fact, relatives of the alleged victims. Peru also challenged witnesses Gloria Cano and Grimaldo Achaui on the grounds that “they are not only the attorneys representing the Chilean citizens, but also members of private organizations that have various cases pending against Peru with the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights and other organs of the United Nations.” It argued that any statements they might make “would be patently biased and partial, because that would serve their immediate interests against the Peruvian State.” 82. At the public hearing, the State reiterated its objections to the witnesses presented. It also asserted that witness Salazar Ardiless was a “hearsay witness” whose testimony was legally “worthless.” 83. As to the objections to the Commission’s witnesses, the Court reserves the right to evaluate their testimony when it delivers its judgment on the merits (supra 45). The Court once again underscores the fact that the standards by which evidence is evaluated in an international human rights tribunal are unique. The grounds for challenging witnesses do not operate as they do in domestic law. Because this is an inquiry into a State’s international responsibility for human rights violations, the Court has greater latitude to use logic and experience when evaluating oral testimony.18 84. The Court’s evaluation of the testimony of the challenged witnesses is as follows: a) The State’s objection to the testimony of Teresa Valdez Escobar, María Angélica Mellado Saavedra, Sandra Cecilia Castillo Petruzzi, Jaime Castillo Navarrete and Juana Ramírez Gonveya became moot, as the witnesses in question did not appear before the Court (supra 48); b) As to the testimony of Gloria Cano and Grimaldo Achaui, in a similar situation the Court has noted that [c]ertain factors may clearly influence a witness’ truthfulness. However, the Government did not present any concrete evidence to show that the witnesses had not told the truth, but rather limited itself to making general observations regarding their alleged incompetence or lack of impartiality. This is insufficient to rebut testimony that is fundamentally consistent with that of other witnesses. The Court cannot ignore such testimony.19 Accordingly, the Court is ordering that the testimony be admitted into evidence, notwithstanding the evaluation made of the testimony taking the witnesses’ characteristics and qualifications into account; and c) Witness Héctor Salazar Ardiles’ testimony will be limited to a recounting of his conversation with the Director of Yanamayo Prison, which the Court considers admissible and therefore will admit into evidence. 18. Loayza Tamayo Case, supra note 4, para. 42. 19. Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988. Series C No. 4, para. 143; Godínez Cruz Case, Judgment of January 20, 1989. Series C No. 5, para. 149; Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales Case, Judgment of March 15, 1989. Series C No. 6, para. 141.