51 hands down a decision, but that decision can be appealed to a higher court. The higher courts in this case are the Courts-Martial. Decisions at this second instance may also be appealed by means of a petition filed with the Supreme Court of Military Justice seeking nullification of the lower-court ruling. The decision at that instance is also subject to appeal, which at that stage would be the motion for review[.] 160. The Court observes that under the law that applies when the crime is treason, the judgment of first instance can be appealed; an appeal seeking nullification of the judgment of the court of second instance is also allowed. In addition to these two remedies, a petition can also be filed seeking review of the final judgment, based on the existence of supervening evidence and provided the individual has not been convicted of treason as a leader, head, or member of a command group of an armed organization. In the instant case, the appeal and the motion seeking nullification were filed by the attorneys for Mr. Castillo Petruzzi, Mr. Mellado Saavedra and Mrs. Pincheira Sáez, while Mr. Astorga Valdez’ attorney petitioned for a review of the final judgment. As a last recourse, a remedy of cassation may be filed with the Supreme Court to challenge decisions of military courts in cases involving civilians. This remedy, recognized in the 1979 Constitution in effect at the time of the detention and applicable in the proceedings against the victims, was altered in the Constitution promulgated on December 29, 1993, which states that the remedy of cassation is allowed only in treason cases where the sentence is death. When the attorneys for Mr. Castillo Petruzzi and Mr. Astorga Valdez filed remedies of cassation, they were dismissed based on the provisions of the Constitution now in effect. 161. The Court observes, as it did earlier (supra 134), that proceedings conducted in the military courts against civilians for the crime of treason violate the guarantee of the competent, independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law, recognized in Article 8(1) of the Convention. The right to appeal the judgment, also recognized in the Convention, is not satisfied merely because there is a higher court than the one that tried and convicted the accused and to which the latter has or may have recourse. For a true review of the judgment, in the sense required by the Convention, the higher court must have the jurisdictional authority to take up the particular case in question. It is important to underscore the fact that from first to last instance, a criminal proceeding is a single proceeding in various stages. Therefore, the concept of a tribunal previously established by law and the principle of due process apply throughout all those phases and must be observed in all the various procedural instances. If the court of second instance fails to satisfy the requirements that a court must meet to be a fair, impartial and independent tribunal previously established by law, then the phase of the proceedings conducted by that court cannot be deemed to be either lawful or valid. In the instant case, the superior court was part of the military structure and as such did not have the independence necessary to act as or be a tribunal previously established by law with jurisdiction to try civilians. Therefore, whereas remedies, albeit very restrictive ones, did exist of which the accused could avail themselves, there were no real guarantees that the case would be reconsidered by a higher court that combined the qualities of competence, impartiality and independence that the Convention requires. 162. The Court therefore finds that the State violated Article 8(2)(h) of the Convention. ***