92 135. Concerning the different judicial proceedings initiated by the different State workers, it is appropriate to point out that they were of three types, to wit: a) constitutional rights protection remedies filed with the Full Supreme Court; b) actions of unconstitutionality against Law 25 filed also with the Full Supreme Court; and c) full-jurisdiction administrative conflicts actions brought before the Third Section of the Supreme Court. 136. The Court must reiterate that the judicial proceedings were based on the application to the dismissed workers of Law 25, which was not in effect at the time of the events that led to the dismissal, and which this Tribunal deems as contrary to the principle of legality and non-retroactivity (supra para. 115). Precisely the cited Law 25 derogated the legal rule that provided for the proceedings applicable at the time of the events for which they were dismissed. 137. Article 8(1) of the Convention establishes the guidelines of the so-called “due process of law,” which consists of the right of all persons to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial judge or tribunal, previously established by law, in the substantiation of any accusation of a criminal nature made against her or him or for the determination of her or his rights.58 Article 8(2) of the Convention establishes, additionally, the minimum guarantees that must be ensured by the States in consistency with the due process of law. For its part, Article 25 of the Convention instructs that a simple and prompt recourse be provided for the protection of the rights of persons. 138. The reason to file the 49 constitutional guarantee protection remedies that were filed with the Full Supreme Court by the dismissed workers, was that Conciliation and Decision Board N° 5, the tribunal responsible for hearing cases of the workers dismissed from certain State institutions at the time of the events that occurred December 4 and 5, 1990, had decided not to admit such cases because of its being incompetent by virtue of Law 25. It is important to point out that, in accordance with Article 91(b) of the Judicial Code of Panama, the Full Supreme Court is the body responsible to hear civil rights protection remedies. In resolving about such civil rights protection remedies, the Supreme Court determined that Conciliation and Decision Board N° 5 had to admit the cases and support the reasons why it did not regard itself competent to hear them. The constitutional rights protection remedies were, therefore, dealt with by the Supreme Court, but only to decide that Conciliation and Decision Board N° 5 had to demonstrate its incompetence, that is, in such a way that no decisions were being made on the problem of the dismissal, nor concerning the provisions in Article 25 of the Convention. 139. Next, some workers requested the Supreme Court, through unconstitutionality actions, to declare that Law 25 was contrary to the Panamanian Constitution, to the American Convention, and to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. According to Article 203(1) of the Panamanian Constitution, the Full Supreme Court is the entity responsible for hearing unconstitutionality cases. The three actions were accumulated, and on May 23, 1991, the Supreme Court handed down its judgment, whereby it declared that only the “paragraph” of Article 2 of Law 25 was unconstitutional. 58 cfr. Genie Lacayo Case. Judgment of January 29, 1997, Series C N° 30, para. 74.