an interpretive principle that does not correspond to the provision interpreted. 29 Therefore, the Inter-American Court cannot assume jurisdiction for the alleged violation of a right or freedom not included in the protection system of the American Convention or in the Protocol of San Salvador. 32. With regard to the evolutive interpretation, the Court has reiterated that human rights treaties are living instruments, whose interpretation must go hand in hand with evolving times and current living conditions. Thus, an evolutive interpretation is consistent with the general rules of interpretation established in Article 29 of the American Convention, as well as those established in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.30 33. However, this method of interpretation cannot be invoked to add rights to the protection system of the Convention or to grant the Court jurisdiction where it does not have it. The appropriate sphere for its application is in the evolutive interpretation of an existing right or freedom, or of a State obligation, already included in the protection system of the Convention or in the Protocol, but in a different and generally broader sense than originally envisaged by its authors, as the Court has done on different occasions, especially when defining or expanding the content of the rights recognized in the Convention, with recourse to the international corpus iuris. An example of this is the inclusion of “gender orientation” in the reference to “any other social condition” as one of the grounds for discrimination prohibited by Article 1(1) of the Convention.31 34. At the same time, the Court recalls that, under Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, supplementary means of interpretation, especially the preparatory work of the treaty, may be used to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of the methods mentioned in Article 31. This implies that they are used in a subsidiary manner.32 I note that the characterization of the debate on the inclusion and scope of Article 26 since the judgment in the case Acevedo Buendía et al. v. Peru and up to the case of Cuscul Pivaral et al. v. Guatemala,33 is not correct. The references made to the preparatory works in those judgments, suggesting that these demonstrated the States’ probable intention to allow the direct justiciability of ESCER through Article 26 of the Convention, is biased, since they only mentioned fragments of the observations made by four States out of a Similarly, see: Case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 16, 2009. Series C No. 205, para. 78. 29 30 102. Cf. Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, supra, para. 114, and Advisory Opinion OC-24/17, supra, para. 58. Cuscul, para. Case of Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of February 24, 2012. Series C No. 239, para. 91. 31 Cf. Case of Cuscul Pivaral et al. v. Guatemala. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 23, f 2018. Series C No. 359, para. 94. 32 In such cases: “[t]he Court recalls that the content of Article 26 of the Convention was the subject of intense debate in the preparatory works, arising from the interest of the States Parties to assign a “direct reference” to economic, social and cultural “rights;” “a provision establishing certain legal mandates […] for its compliance and application” [Chile]; as well as “the [respective] mechanisms [for its] promotion and protection” [Chile]; since the Preliminary Draft of the treaty prepared by the Inter-American Commission made reference to such mechanisms in two Articles which, according to some States, only “contemplated, in a merely declarative text, the conclusions reached at the Buenos Aires Conference” [Uruguay]. The review of said preparatory works of the Convention also proves that the main observations, upon which the approval of the Convention was based, placed a special emphasis on “granting the economic, social and cultural rights the maximum protection compatible with the specific conditions in most of the American States.” [Brazil]. Accordingly, as part of the debate during the preparatory works, it was also proposed that “[the] exercise [of those rights] be made possible through the action of the courts” [Guatemala]”. Cf. Case of Acevedo Buendía et al. (“Discharged and Retired Employees of the Comptroller’s Office”) v. Peru. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of July 1, 2009. Series C No. 198, para. 99; Case of Poblete Vilches et al. v. Chile. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of March 8, 2018. Series C No. 349, para. 101, and Case of Cuscul Pivaral et al. v. Guatemala. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 23, 2018. Series C No. 359, para. 95. 33