pursuant to their constitutional procedures and the provisions of the Convention, all legislative or other measures necessary to make effective the rights and freedoms protected by the Convention. This obligation entails the adoption of two types of measures. On the one hand, the elimination of laws and practices of any nature that result in a violation of the guarantees established in the Convention91 either because they fail to acknowledge those rights and freedoms or because they hinder their exercise.92 On the other, the enactment of laws and the implementation of practices conducive to the effective observance of those guarantees. 93 101. In this specific case, based on the resolutions issued by the administrative authority in charge of the Public Prosecution Service,94 the evidence provided 95 and the arguments of the parties – especially those of the State96 – the Court notes that the powers exercised by that authority to appoint the presumed victim as a provisional prosecutor without specifying any resolutive condition that would determine the termination of the appointment, and also to terminate the designation in a discretionary manner, were supported by the inexistence of a specific legal framework that guaranteed the stability of the official while he held the post. Moreover, the Court also notes the existence of a judicial interpretation, including the opinion of the Constitutional Court, consistent with the decisions of the administrative authority.97 102. Therefore, based on the foregoing, since it did not eliminate practices that resulted in a violation of the guarantees established in the Convention, and in view of the failure to issue norms conducive to the effective observance of such guarantees, the State failed to comply with the duty to adopt domestic legal provisions pursuant to Article 2 of the Convention, in relation to the guarantee of irremovability of prosecutors, recognized as one of the judicial guarantees established in Article 8(1) of the Convention. Cf. Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of May 30, 1999. Series C No. 52, para. 207, and Case of Martínez Esquivia v. Colombia, supra, para. 118. 91 Cf. Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of June 21, 2002. Series C No. 94, para. 113, and Case of Martínez Esquivia v. Colombia, supra, para. 118. 92 Cf. Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru, supra, para. 207, and Case of Martínez Esquivia v. Colombia, supra, para. 118. 93 The resolution of June 30, 1998, cited Laws Nos. 26623, 26695 and 26738 (supra footnote 28 and para. 44), without specifying the articles. The resolutions of April 8, 2002, and January 21, 2003, cited article 64 of Legislative Decree 052, Organic Law of the Public Prosecution Service (supra para. 43). Lastly, the resolution of February 14, 2003, cited articles 5 of Law 27362 (supra para. 46) and 64 of Legislative Decree 052, Organic Law of the Public Prosecution Service. Cf. Resolution of the Executive Committee of the Public Prosecution Service of June 30, 1998 (evidence file, volume I, annex 1 to the Merits Report, folio 4); Resolution of the Prosecutor General of April 8, 2002 (evidence file, volume IV, annex 16 to the answering brief, folio 953); Resolution of the Prosecutor General of January 21, 2003 (evidence file, volume I, annex 2 to the Merits Report, folio 6), and Resolution of the Prosecutor General of February 14, 2003 (evidence file, volume I, annex 4 to the Merits Report, folio 12). 94 Among other matters, the witness Rita Arleny Figueroa Vásquez stated that “in 1997, […] Law No. 26898 was issued […] empowering the Executive Committee of the Public Prosecution Service to designate provisional prosecutors; this law, together with Laws Nos. 26623, 26695 and 26738 formed the framework that regulated the designation of provisional prosecutors,” and that, “by law, designations of provisional prosecutors are temporary in nature, as indicated by the legislators in article 5 of Law No. 27362 […] which derogated the homologation of tenured and provisional magistrates of the Judiciary and of the Public Prosecution Service.” Cf. Statement made by Rita Arleny Figueroa Vásquez (evidence file, volume VI, affidavits, folios 1248 and 1259). 95 In its answering brief, the State indicated that, in the case of the presumed victim, “both the designation and the termination of the appointment occurred for reasons that were duly justified by the institution and in keeping with the attributes and powers recognized by law to the Public Prosecution Service, in light of the need to cover vacancies on a temporary basis. Consequently, the termination of the appointment, in this specific case, was due to the extinction of a need of service.” 96 The State also indicated that “the domestic courts, both of the Judiciary and also the Constitutional Court, have ruled on the provisional nature of magistrates, and a single line of thought can be observed in such rulings in cases that relate to the said matter.” And it added that “according to domestic case law, the Constitutional Court has been ruling on different analogous cases to the effect that ‘a substitution or provisional designation, as such, constitutes a situation that does not give rise to any rights other than those inherent in the post that is provisionally occupied by the individual who has no tenure of any kind […].’” 97 29