that reason that it was necessary to adopt it. Its signature cannot be explained in any other way. 98. Based on the above, it can be concluded that the Protocol is, consequently, the clear demonstration that the provisions of Article 26 do not establish any human right. VI. CONCLUSIONS 99. Therefore, it is based on all the above, including the comments in the Preliminary observations,104 that I dissent from the judgment; in particular, from the text of its second operative paragraph.105 100. In this regard, it is necessary to point out that, by rejecting the preliminary objection of lack of jurisdiction to examine violations of human rights invoking the application of Article 26, the judgment leaves no space for this dissenting opinion to rule on its other operative paragraphs. In other words, by maintaining in this opinion that the Court lacks the said jurisdiction, logically, I am asserting that it was not in order for it to rule on the merits of the case, as it has. The only exception to this is the contents of the eleventh operative paragraph, which I have voted in favor of simply because it repeats what is established in the Court’s Rules of Procedure,106 and therefore, even if it had not been included, it would be applied. 101. In addition, it would appear desirable to insist, once again, that this opinion does not concern the existence of the right to work in the sphere of international law. This falls outside its purpose. It merely maintains that the possible violation of this right cannot be submitted to the consideration and decision of the Court. 102. Furthermore, this opinion should not be understood to signify that I would not be in favor of the eventual judicialization of the economic, social and cultural rights. In this regard, I consider that, if the jurisdictional competence is established, this should be done by those responsible for the international legislative function. It does not seem desirable that the organ responsible for the inter-American judicial function should assume that other function, especially when the States to which the latter corresponds are democratic and, in this regard, governed by the Inter-American Democratic Charter,107 which establishes the separation of powers and civic participation in public affairs, and which, without doubt, the Court should also respect within its own area of activity. 104 Supra, II. 105 Supra, footnote 3. 106 Art. 69. “Monitoring compliance with judgments and other decisions of the Court. 1. The procedure for monitoring compliance with the judgments and other decisions of the Court shall be carried out through the submission of reports by the State and observations to those reports by the victims or their legal representatives. The Commission shall present observations to the State’s reports and to the observations of the victims or their representatives. 2. The Court may require from other sources of information relevant data regarding the case in order to evaluate compliance therewith. To that end, the Court may also request the expert opinions or reports that it considers appropriate. 3. When it deems it appropriate, the Court may call the State and the victims’ representatives to a hearing in order to monitor compliance with its decisions; the Court shall hear the opinion of the Commission at that hearing. 4. Once the Court has obtained all relevant information, it shall determine the state of compliance with its decisions and issue the relevant orders. 5. These rules also apply to cases that have not been submitted by the Commission. Adopted at the twenty-eighth special session of the OAS General Assembly held in Lima, Peru, on September 11, 2001. 107 26