Convention, then it is not necessary to make an explicit amendment of them. Decisions that entail State obligations to amend domestic laws should be founded on an evident and irresolvable contradiction with the human rights established in the Convention. In any case, I understand the Court’s purpose in simultaneously requiring that domestic law be interpreted in keeping with the Convention and its case law, on the one hand, and the amendment of the law, on the other, is based on consequential logic: If the domestic agents of justice understand that the literal meaning of the domestic laws is contrary to the Convention in the terms indicated in the Court’s judgment, it will be necessary to amend the laws. 23. Ultimately, I believe that, in its decisions, the Court should favor the exercise of the control of conventionality by the corresponding interpretation to avoid the delays inherent in amendments to the law, which usually involve lengthy procedures and impede the prompt application of the norms of the Convention and the standards established by the Court. Humberto Antonio Sierra Porto Judge Pablo Saavedra Alessandri Secretary 6