3 8. The present Resolution, added to the criteria followed by the Court in its Judgment on the merits of 29 January 1997 in the present Genie Lacayo case, give me cause for concern. The new fact, pointed out in the present appeal of revision, occurred thirteen days after the above-mentioned Judgment on the merits was delivered by the Inter-American Court, should, in my view, persuade the Court to reconsider its pronouncements in the Judgment on the merits as to the compliance with the provisions of Articles 25 (right to an effective remedy), 8(1) (judicial guarantees), and 2 (legislative obligations), in combination with Article 1(1) of the American Convention, in the circumstances of the cas d'espèce. 9. In the present Resolution, the Inter-American Court considers that the new fact pointed out in the appeal - the Judgment n. 8 of the Supreme Court of Justice of Nicaragua of 12.02.1997 - not only was not alleged as being contemporary to its Judgment on the merits in Genie Lacayo, but furthermore does not fit into the grounds of revision and cannot, thus, exert influence in the modification of this Judgment. It can be argued that the revision can only take place on the basis of a new fact, but which occurred prior to - and not subsequently to - the delivery of the Judgment on the merits, even if known by the tribunal only after it rendered the judgment. This is certain, except when such fact is part of a continuing situation of alleged incompatibility with the international conventional obligations of protection of human rights. The notion of "continuing situation", - nowadays supported by a vast case-law in the domain of the International Law of Human Rights, ix - comprises violations of human rights which, e.g., cannot be divorced from the legislation from which they result (and which remains in force). 10. May I refer to the criteria which, in my view, call for revision. First of all, the thesis of the necessity of the previous application of a law for the determination of its compatibility or otherwise with the the American Convention on Human Rights is taken to an extreme in the Genie Lacayo case, as the Court distinguishes between provisions which were applied and provisions which presumably were not applied of the decrees ns. 591 and 600 (of 1980), as may be seen from a comparison between paragraphs 83 and 91 (and also 92) of the Judgment on the merits. With this, the Court limits itself to the point of rendering it impossible to itself to pronounce upon the legislative obligations of the respondent State. My understanding is, on the contrary, in the sense that the existence itself of a law entitles the victims of violations of the rights protected by the American Convention to require its compatibilization with the provisions of the Convention, and the Court is obliged to pronounce on the question, without having to wait for the occurrence of an additional damage by the continued application of such law.x 11. Secondly, the thesis that, as the Court is not an appeals tribunal or a court for the review of decisions of national tribunals, and as any eventual defects of the military legal procedure constitute a domestic question, it being incumbent upon the Court only to indicate the procedural violations of the rights enshrined in the Convention, as it can be inferred from paragraph 94 of the Judgment on the merits, such thesis leads to a rigid compartmentalization between the international and the ix. Analyzed, from its very beginnings, e.g., in my book The Application of the Rule of Exhaustion of Local Remedies in International Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp. 187-249. x. Cf. my Dissenting Opinions in the El Amparo case, Judgment on reparations of 14 September 1996, and Resolution of interpretation of judgment of 16 April 1997; and Caballero Delgado and Santana case, Judgment on reparations of 29 January 1997.