4 domestic legal orders in the present domain of protection, and deprives the Court of its attribution to pronounce on the judicial obligations of the respondent State. My understanding is, on the contrary, in the sense that, in the present domain of protection, there is a constant interaction between international law and domestic law, to the benefit of the protected human beings. 12. Human rights treaties, e.g., confer functions of protection upon the organs of the States Parties, which have the primary responsibility of safeguard of those rights. If, on the one hand, they impose on the individual complainants the duty of prior exhaustion of domestic law remedies, xi on the other hand they impose at the same time on the respondent States the duty to provide effective domestic law remedies. If States were not obliged to provide effective local remedies, individual complainants should not be required to exhaust such remedies as a condition of admissibility of their petitions or complaints. The duties of the respondent and the complainant, in this particular, are essentially complementary in the present domain of protection. 13. In rendering the Judgment on the merits in Genie Lacayo, on 29 January 1997, the Inter-American Court pointed out that the proceedings in the case at Nicaraguan domestic law level had lasted more than five years (paragraph 81), and even so it expressed its expectation that the Supreme Court of Justice would remedy the procedural violations of the rights enshrined in the American Convention in the ambit of domestic law in resolving the then pending application for Cassation (recurso de casación) (paragraph 94). But shortly after that Judgment on the merits, the Judgment n. 8 of the Supreme Court of Justice of Nicaragua (of 12 February 1997), in dismissing the Cassation (recurso de casación), frustrated the expectation of the Inter-American Court. 14. The Nicaraguan Supreme Court of Justice itself, in a previous judgment, of 20 December 1993, referred xii the case to the military jurisdiction. Following the Judgment on the merits of the Inter-American Court, the Supreme Court of Justice dismissed - on questions of form - the Cassation (recurso de casación), on the basis of the military legislation (decree n. 591). In sum, the 1993 judgment determined that members of the military should be tried in a special military forum for ordinary crimes, and the 1997 judgment found that the application of the military legislation had been correct. 15. Even so, in the first judgment (of 1993) the Supreme Court of Justice was attentive to indicate that it was aware of the shortcomings of the aforementioned military legislation: it deemed it fit to ponder, in relation to the application of the decrees ns. 591 and 600, that although it is not pleased with the law applicable to the case at issue, because, in its view, it is not in keeping with the new trends and doctrines on the matter, nor with its own thinking, as it considers that the members of the military ought to be tried in the ordinary courts when they are involved in facts qualified by law as ordinary crimes or offenses, and that the military courts should know only cases which did not transcend the strictly military ambit (...,) nevertheless and much to its regret, xi. Not as a question pertaining to the merits, but rather as a condition of pure admissibility of a complaint, to be resolved in limine litis, - as I sustain in my Dissenting Opinion in the Resolution of this Court of 18 May 1995 in the present Genie Lacayo case. xii. By means of the interpretation of a constitutional provision (Article 159).