2 4. The Statute of the International Court of Justice, as recalled by the InterAmerican Court in the present Resolution, provides for the possibility of revision (admitted since 1920),v when the existence is found of a new fact capable of exerting a decisive influence, and which, before the judgment, was unknown to the Court and to the party requesting the revision (Article 61). In fact, the appeal of revision has roots in the norms of Public International Law itself, as illustrated, e. g., by the 1907 Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (Article 83). 5. No one would dare to deny the truly exceptional character of an application for the judicial review, which always calls for a detailed and rigorous examination of its admissibility and content. On the other hand, the possibility of revision in no way affects the final character of the judgments vi; that this is so is illustrated by the fact that both the European Court of Human Rights and the International Court of Justice admit that possibility. To the position of those two international tribunals one may add the practice, in the same sense, of the Administrative Tribunals of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and of the United Nations.vii 6. International case-law in fact points out the exceptional character of the appeal of revision, with its exercise being admitted to consider a new fact (unknown at the moment of the decision and susceptible of exerting a decisive influence on this latter), or to correct an error of fact or material error (or false verification of the facts, distinct from the error as to the law), thus avoiding an injustice. viii The fact that no provision is made for it in the American Convention on Human Rights or in its Statute or Regulations does not prevent the Inter-American Court from declaring admissible an appeal of revision of a judgment: the apparent vacatio legis ought in this particular to give way to an imperative of natural justice. 7. The Court ought thus to decide not so much by analogy with general international law (reflected in the aforementioned provision of the Statute of the International Court of Justice), as claimed by the complainant party in the present Genie Lacayo case, but rather on the basis - in application of the principle jura novit curia - of general principles of procedural law, and making use of the powers inherent to its judicial function. Human beings, and the institutions they integrate, are not infallible, and there is no jurisdiction worthy of this name which does not admit the possibility - albeit exceptional - of revision of a judgment, be it at international law level, or at domestic law level. II. The Juridical Foundation of the Application for Judicial Review. 5. With the adoption of the Statute of the old Permanent Court of International Justice. vi. As pointed out by the European Court of Human Rights, in declaring admissible an appeal of revision in the above-cited case of Pardo versus France (decision of 10.07.1996, par. 21). vii. The Statute of the Administrative Tribunal of the United Nations provides for the appeal of revision (Article 12), and that Tribunal has on numerous occasions pronounced on appeals of revision. The ILO Administrative Tribunal has likewise developed an extensive case-law on appeals of revision (even though that appeal was not originally foreseen in its Statute or Regulations). viii. ILO Administrative Tribunal, Villegas case, judgment n. 442, cit. in 27 Annuaire français de droit international (1981) p. 351; ILO Administrative Tribunal, Acosta Andres et alii case, judgment n. 570, cit. in 29 Annuaire français de droit international (1983) pp. 400-401.