10 taken into account. These elements are inter-connected in Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, indicating that the process of interpretation should be taken as a whole. It would be contrary to the object and purpose of the Convention, and would fail to take into account its context, to apply the regulatory norms without the criterion of reasonableness, resulting in an imbalance between the parties and compromising the realization of justice. 41. As the Court has stated: “Reasonableness” implies a value judgment and, when applied to a law, conformity to the principles of common sense. It is also used in reference to the parameters of interpretation of treaties and, therefore, of the Convention. Reasonable means just, proportionate and equitable, in opposition to unjust, absurd and arbitrary. It is a qualifier with an axiological content which implies opinion but, in another sense, may be employed juridically as, in fact, the courts frequently do, in that any state activity should be not only valid but reasonable. (Certain Attributes of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Arts. 41, 42, 44, 46, 47, 50 and 51 of the American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-13/93 of July 16, 1993. Series A No. 13, para. 33). 42. It is not possible to apply the procedural rules of the American Convention without giving their proper weight to its context, object, and purpose, as a basis for the interpretation of all the applicable provisions in a given case. “What is essential,” as the Court has pointed out, “is that the conditions necessary for the preservation of the procedural rights of the parties not be diminished or unbalanced, and that the objectives of the different procedures be met.” (Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of June 26, 1987. Series C No. 1, para. 33; Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of June 26, 1987. Series C No. 2, para. 38 and the Godinez Cruz Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of June 26, 1987. Series C No. 3, para. 36). The formal defects raised by the Government do not constitute a procedural injury to the State, in this case, of a kind that would justify according to the purely literal meaning of a regulatory norm preference over the superior interest of the realization of justice in the application of the American Convention. For the reasons stated, the Court rejects, as groundless, the second preliminary objection. VII Now, therefore, THE COURT, DECIDES: