7 “month” refers to a calendar month, and that to interpret the expression three months from Article 51(1) of the Convention as ninety days would be inconsistent with the text and ordinary meaning of the terms of that provision. According to the Commission, Article 51(1) should be interpreted in harmony with the spirit of the provision, which is to offer the State the opportunity to resolve the matter by complying with the recommendations of the Commission. The Commission concludes that the period of three months which began on October 20, 1994, expired on January 20, 1995. Consequently, the application which was transmitted to the Court on January 18, 1995, was submitted within that period. 26. The Court will not analyze whether the application was submitted within ninety days of October 20, 1994, since it is of the opinion that, in accordance with Article 51(1) of the American Convention, the period of three months should be based on the Gregorian calendar month, which is to say, from date to date. 27. Although the question argued in this case has not been raised previously, it has been the regular practice of the Court to compute the period of three months referred to in Article 51(1) of the Convention from date to date. (Aloeboetoe et al. Case, Judgment of December 4, 1991. Series C No. 11; Gangaram Panday Case, Judgment of January 21, 1994. Series C No 16; Genie Lacayo Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of January 27, 1995. Series C No. 21; Caballero Delgado and Santana Case, Judgment of December 8, 1995. Series C No. 22; Neira Alegría et al. Case, Judgment of January 19, 1995. Series C No. 20; Maqueda Case, Resolution of January 17, 1995. Series C No. 18; El Amparo Case, Judgment of January 18, 1995. Series C No. 19). 28. In the Caballero Delgado and Santana Case (Caballero Delgado and Santana Case Preliminary Objections, Judgment of January 21, 1994. Series C No. 17), the Court inadvertently used the expression “90 days” as the equivalent of “three months” (paragraph 39) when referring to an argument of the Commission, and applied the two expressions synonymously (paragraph 43). Nevertheless, in that same case, the Court applied the criteria of three calendar months, as it is in paragraph 39 of that judgment, which applied a period of three months from October 17, 1991 to January 17, 1992. (if the period had been computed in days and not by the Gregorian calendar, ninety-three days would have transpired). Also in the Neira Alegría et al. Case (Neira Alegría et all Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of December 11, 1991. Series C No. 13, paras. 32-34, the Court applied the period of three months from June 11, 1990 to September 11, 1990. (Three calendar months made up of ninety-three days) 29. The Court decides that, in accordance with Article 51(1) of the American Convention, the Inter-American Commission has a period of three months from the transmission of the Report referred to in Article 50(1) of the Convention, to submit the case to the Court. The expression “period of three months” should be understood in its ordinary meaning. According to the Dictionary of the Royal Academy of the Spanish Language, “period” “[is the] term or time indicated for something” and “month” “[is the] number of consecutive days from the one indicated to another of the same date in the following month.” Additionally, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties [Article 31(1)] considers in its rules of interpretation, the ordinary meaning of the words, as well as the context, and the object and purpose of the treaty (see infra para. 40). 30. In the majority of the legislation of Latin American countries, it is established that the first and last day of a period of months or years should have the same numbering in the