4 for the Crime of Terrorism so as to proceed with conformance of the law; consequently they declared the above-cited judgment to be UNENFORCEABLE; ORDERED that Peru’s withdrawal from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights proceed by the corresponding diplomatic means, with the knowledge of the Public Legal Representative of Judicial Affairs of the Department of the Interior and the Terrorism Court respectively; and they returned them. That order also stated that “the petitioners did not fulfill the requirement of exhaustion of domestic jurisdiction so as to resort to the Inter-American jurisdiction.” 10. The June 28, 1999 notes sent by the Secretariat to the victim and the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights (hereinafter “the Commission” or “the InterAmerican Commission”) by means of which it remitted the documents referred to in the preceding paragraph and requested observations with respect to them. 11. The July 9, 1999 note in which the Commission requested an extension of the deadline granted for the submission of observations. By means of a note dated 12 of the same month and year the Court granted until July 26, 1999. 12. The July 21, 1999 communication from Mr. César Gaviria, Secretary General of the Organization of American States (hereinafter “the OAS”), to which he attached note number 7-5-M/276 of July 1, 1999, which was presented to him by Ms. Beatriz M. Ramacciotti, Permanent Representative of Peru before the OAS. This note expressed, as Peru’s position, the following: a. the Judgment on the Merits rendered by the Court in the present case declared that there was a violation of the principle non bis in idem, established as a judicial guarantee in Article 8(4) of the American Convention on Human Rights, based on the full importance given to the proceedings in the military court and that court’s final judgment; b. in relation to the Commission’s argument that the military tribunals that tried Ms. Loayza Tamayo lacked independence and impartiality in accordance with Article 8(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights, the Court deemed that it was “unnecessary to rule ... inasmuch as Ms. María Elena Loayza-Tamayo was acquitted by that military court and, therefore, the possible failure to meet those requirements did not cause her injury in that regard, irrespective of the other violations which will be examined in the following paragraphs of this Judgment”; c. the Court questioned due process both in the military court as well as in the civil court, as can be found in paragraph 62 of the Judgment on the Merits in the present case. Moreover, the Court attached importance to the judgment rendered in the military court even though it refers to that court as “lack[ing] jurisdiction” to hear the case and despite that in that court “the fundamental rights embodied in the concept of due process were greatly restricted”; d. in the Judgment on the Merits the Court held that Decree-Laws No. 25.475 and No. 25.659 were incompatible with the American Convention on Human Rights. The Commission and the victim requested the reform of the cited Decree-Laws in the reparations stage, which had not been requested in the application to the Court, requests which the State opposed. Nonetheless, the Court incurred in “radical incompetence” by ordering in paragraph 5 of