The latter assertion is correct, but the position adopted by the Judgment on this matter is not in agreement with it. The Judgment reproaches that the State’s Decision opted for “one of the scientific positions on this issue to define as of when it was considered that life began” and that “understood that conception would be the moment when the egg is fertilized and assumed that, as of that moment, a person existed who held the right to life.” 59 However, while asserting this, the Judgment adopts the opposite view, that which makes a difference between “two complementary and essential moments of embryonic development: fertilization and implantation,” and holds that “only after completion of the second moment that the cycle is concluded, and that conception can be understood to have occurred.” 60 In order to reach this conclusion the Judgment resorts to two reasons. One is of a scientific nature, “an embryo has no chance of survival if implantation does not occur.” 61 The other is that “when Article 4 of the American Convention was drafted the dictionary of the Real Academia differentiated between the moment of fertilization and the moment of conception, understanding conception as implantation,” and, thus, “[w]hen drafting the relevant provisions in the American Convention, the moment of fertilization was not mentioned.” 62 As to the first argument, the Judgment acknowledges that there are several scientific positions on the matter of “when life begins” 63 and of the understanding of “conception.” 64 In spite of this, the Judgment sides with only one of them: that conception is produced at the moment of the embryo’s implantation in the woman’s uterus. The Judgment does not analyze the other positions, particularly the one that considers that “human life begins with the fusion of spermatozoid and egg, an observable ‘moment of conception’.” 65 This Judgment simply dismisses this position. The Judgment’s position seems to reveal some inconsistencies with other of its assertions. On the one hand, with the statement that “[t]he first birth of a baby resulting from in vitro fertilization occurred in England in 1978,” and that “[i]n Latin America, the first baby born through in vitro fertilization and embryo transfer was reported in Argentina in 1984.” 66 On the other hand, with the statement that “the definition of ‘conception’ accepted by the authors of the American Convention has changed” because “[p]rior to IVF, the possibility of fertilization occurring outside a woman’s body was not contemplated scientifically.” Indeed, these statements show that, when the Convention was signed—in 1969—, it was not possible to know that “conception” and “fertilization” were two absolutely differentiated and distinct phenomena. Hence, it is impossible to share the understanding that “the definition of ‘conception’ accepted by the authors of the American Convention has changed.” It may well be the case that some medical 59 Para. 177. 60 Para. 186. 61 Para. 187. 62 Para. 187. 63 Para. 177. 64 Paras. 180 to 185. 65 Para 182. 66 Párr. 66.