8 the full extent of its natural consequences. Thus, it would be decided that a confession or testimony obtained through the intimidation or even the torture of the witness is admissible, if, in the Court's opinion, it appears to corroborate other evidence and helps to clarify the facts. In this way, the proceeding would be impaired and we would return to an probative regime that has been widely overcome and condemned. Briefly, in matters of evidence - as in so many others - the end does not justify the means. To the contrary, the legitimacy of the latter helps to legitimize the end. Obtaining a hypothetical - and even remote - historical truth, does not exempt from fulfilling the requirements of the law and good faith that should govern the conduct of the judge. B) The burden of proof 30. I have already said that, when examining the violation of Article 5 of the Convention (Right to humane treatment), the judgment emphasizes an interesting procedural issue, which is, the burden of proof in the hypothesis of forced disappearance of persons, which could also engender other possible violations. In principle, the burden of proof - onus probandi, which normally does not constitute an obligation, but a condition to be satisfied in order to obtain a determined procedural advantage - corresponds to the person who states a fact on which the claim put forward is totally or partially based. This rule cannot be applied in absolute terms in a process to protect human rights, nor could it be applied in any procedural process dominated by the principle of historical truth. It is evident that, in the first stage of the procedure, the Commission must investigate the facts fully and objectively, independently of the assertions made by the participants, precisely in order to learn the historical truth and, it is even more evident, that the Court must assume this same function in the procedural stage that concerns it. 31. However, there are hypotheses where the burden of proof is naturally displaced from the person who asserts a fact to the person who denies it, when the latter is in a better position to prove what is said - the fact or the situation on which his defense is based - taking into account the circumstances of the case. In my opinion, this is what the expression contained in the judgment implies, which has precedents in other decisions of the Court as well as similarities, also cited, to a decision of the United Nations Human Rights Committee: “in cases of forced disappearance, the State's defense cannot rely on the impossibility of the plaintiff to present evidence in the proceedings since, in such cases, it is the State that controls the means to clarify the facts that have occurred in its jurisdiction and, therefore, in practice, it is necessary to rely on the cooperation of the State itself in order to obtain the required evidence” (para. 152 of the Judgment). 32. In my opinion, the Court has acted correctly by not establishing a universal and rigid principle about the burden of proof, which thus maintains its relative character. Indeed, although it is certain that the rule could correspond - both when the burden is established and when it is dispensed with - to most cases, according to its usual nature, it is also certain that the circumstances in which cases are presented introduces, a fortiori, a pertinent corrective, whose consequence could be the inversion of the burden of proof. In other words, the non-observance of the general rule, precisely in favor of justice, which depends more on the reality of things than on the abstract rationality of principles that could be irrational, and then unjust or unfair, in the specific reality of the disputed facts. 33. In cases such as forced disappearance - and others, including, for example, the demonstration that remedies under domestic law are accessible and effective,