2 5. Therefore, the respondent Government cannot subsequently raise that preliminary objection before the Court, as it failed to raise it, in a timely manner, for the decision of the Commission. If, as in the present case, the respondent Government waived that objection by not raising it in limine litis in the prior procedure before the Commission, it is inconceivable that the respondent Government may freely withdraw that waiver in the subsequent procedure before the Court (estoppel/forclusion). 6. The grounds of my position, which I reiterate here with conviction, are expounded in detail in my Separate Opinion in the Judgment of the Court of 4 December 1991, in the Gangaram Panday case (Preliminary Objections). There is no need to repeat them here ipsis literis, but rather to single out and develop some aspects which I deem especially relevant in relation to the present case of Loayza-Tamayo, just as I did in my Separate Opinion in the Judgment of the Court of 30 January 1996 in the Castillo Páez case (Preliminary Objections). 7. Just as the Commission’s decisions on the inadmissibility of petitions or communications are considered definitive and non-appealable, its decisions of admissibility should be treated likewise, also considered definitive and unsusceptible to reopening by the respondent Government in the subsequent procedure before the Court. Why is it that the respondent Government is allowed to attempt to reopen a decision on admissibility by the Commission before the Court and an individual complainant does not have the same faculty to question a decision on inadmissibility of the Commission before the Court? 8. Such reopening of review by the Court of a decision on admissibility by the Commission creates an imbalance between the parties, in favor of the respondent governments (all the more so since individuals currently do not even have locus standi before the Court). This being so, the decisions of inadmissibility by the Commission should also be allowed to be reopened by the alleged victims and submitted to the Court. Either all decisions -of admissibility or not- of the Commission are allowed to be reopened before the Court, or they are all kept exclusive to the Commission. 9. This understanding is the one that is best suited to the basic notion of collective guarantee underlying the American Convention on Human Rights, as well as all treaties of international protection of human rights. Instead of reviewing the decisions on admissibility by the Commission, the Court should be able to concentrate more on the examination of questions of substance in order to fulfill with more speed and security its role of interpreting and applying of the American Convention, determining the occurrence or not of violations of the Convention and its juridical consequences. The Court is not, in my view, a tribunal of appeals of decisions of the Commission on admissibility. 10. The alleged reopening of questions of pure admissibility before the Court surrounds the process with uncertainties, prejudicial to both parties. It further generates the possibility of divergent or conflicting decisions on the matter by the Commission and the Court, thus fragmenting the unity inherent in a decision of admissibility. This in no way contributes to the perfecting of the system of guarantees of the American Convention. The principal concern of both the Court and the Commission should lie, not in the zealous internal distribution of attributions and competences in the jurisdictional mechanism of the American 31; and the judgments cited supra (Note 1) in the three cases concerning Honduras, paragraphs 88-90 (Velásquez Rodríguez), 90-92 (Godínez Cruz), and 87-89 (Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales); and earlier, Decision of the Court of 1981 in the matter of Viviana Gallardo et al., paragraph 26. 3 The 1996 Judgment on the Preliminary Objections in the Castillo Páez case, paras. 41-45.