4 14. The rationale of my position, such as I have manifested it in the work of the Court,9 ultimately lays in the aim of assuring the necessary balance or procedural equality of the parties before the Court -that is, between the petitioning plaintiffs and the respondent governments-essential to all jurisdictional systems of international protection of human rights. Without the locus standi in judicio of both parties10 any system of protection finds itself irremediably mitigated, as it is not reasonable to conceive rights without the procedural capacity to vindicate them directly. 15. In the universe of the international law of human rights, it is the individual who alleges violations of his human rights, who alleges having suffered damages, who has to comply with the requirement of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies, who actively participates in an eventual friendly settlement, and who is the beneficiary (he or his relatives) of eventual reparations and indemnities. In the examination of the questions of admissibility before the Commission, the individual complainants and the respondent Governments are parties.11 The reopening of such questions before the Court, without the presence of one of the parties (the petitioning plaintiffs), militates against the principle of procedural equality (equality of arms/égalité des armes). 16. In our regional system of protection,12 the spectre of the persistent denial of the procedural capacity of the individual petitioner before the Inter-American Court, a true capitis diminutio, arose from dogmatic considerations, belonging to another historical era, which tended to avoid his direct access to the international judicial organ. Such considerations, in my view, in our time lack support or meaning, even more so when referring to an international tribunal of human rights. 17. In the inter-American system of protection, de lege ferenda one gradually ought to overcome the paternalistic and anachronistic conception of the total intermediation of the Commission between the individual (the true complaining party) and the Court, according to clear and precise criteria and rules, previously and carefully defined. In the present domain of protection, every international jurist, faithful to the historical origins of his discipline, will know to contribute to the rescue of the position of the human being as a subject of international law (droit des gens), endowed with international legal personality and full capacity. his reply, that the respondent Government appeared no longer to insist upon that objection. Since the Government did not question the Commission’s analysis, the Court took formal notice of the Government’s "withdrawal" of the objection of non-exhaustion, thus putting an end to the question (Judgment cit. supra, paragraphs 38-39 and 52). 9 E.g., in the public hearing of the Court of 17 January 1996, in the El Amparo case, concerning Venezuela. 10 It cannot go unnoticed that the question of locus standi in judicio of individuals before the Court (in cases already submitted to it by the Commission) is distinct from the right to submit a concrete case for decision by the Court, which Article 61(1) of the American Convention currently reserves only to the Commission and the States Parties to the Convention. 11 Regarding the admissibility stage of a petition or communication before the Commission, the American Convention refers to "the party alleging violation of his rights" [Articles 46(1)(b) and 46(2)(b)], to the “petitioner” himself and the State [Article 47(c)], and to the "parties concerned" before the Commission (Article 48(1)(f) having clearly in mind the individual complainants and the respondent Governments. Cf. also, in the same sense, Articles 32(a) and (c); 33; 34(4) and (7); 36; 37(2)(b) and (3); and 43(1) and (2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission. 12 In the framework of this latter, to the Inter-American Commission, in its turn, is reserved the role of defender of the “public interests” of the system, as guardian of the correct application of the American Convention. If to this role one continues to add the additional function of defender of the interests of the alleged victims, as an “intermediary” between these latter and the Court, an undesirable ambiguity which should be avoided.