-55in the meaning of the Convention.”31 This guarantee to protect the rights of the individual includes not only the direct safeguard of vulnerable individuals but, also, the next of kin, who, owing to the specific circumstances and events of the case, are those who file the claim in the domestic order.32 76. Also, the Court has said that Article 25(1) of the Convention incorporates the principle of the effectiveness of the procedural protection mechanisms or instruments designed to ensure those rights. As the Court has already stated, according to the Convention: States Parties have an obligation to provide effective judicial remedies to the victims of human rights violations (Art. 25), remedies that must be substantiated in accordance with the rules of due process of law (Art. 8(1)), all in keeping with the general obligation of such States to guarantee the free and full exercise of the rights recognized by the Convention to all persons subject to their jurisdiction.33 77. When considering the effectiveness of the domestic remedies in this case, the Court will examine first the effectiveness of the remedy of habeas corpus and, in particular, the State’s argument that this remedy was not appropriate to trace the Serrano Cruz sisters, because the criminal proceedings were the suitable way to establish their whereabouts and the consequent responsibilities. 78. In this regard, it is worth reiterating that the remedy of habeas corpus was filed on November 13, 1995, by the alleged victims’ mother (supra para. 48(15)) and that, on March 14, 1996, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice decided to dismiss the habeas corpus procedure, on the basis that “habeas corpus […] [was] not a means of investigating the whereabouts of a person detained illegally thirteen years previously […] by members of the Atlacatl Battalion, [whose military leaders] c[ould] not be summoned[, because this Battalion] no longer exist[ed]” (supra para. 48(21)). As has been established (supra para. 48(22)), the filed criminal proceedings were reopened on April 19, 1996 (supra para. 48(23)), as a result of this decision of the Constitutional Chamber on habeas corpus, because it ordered that this decision “should be remitted to the Chalatenango Trial Judge, together with case 112/93, so that he could continue investigating the reported facts” and then inform the Chamber. 79. In its case law, the Court has established that, among essential judicial guarantees, habeas corpus represents the appropriate means of guaranteeing liberty, controlling respect for a person’s life and integrity, and preventing his disappearance or ignorance about his place of detention, and also to protect the individual from torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment.34 The Court considers that habeas corpus can be an effective remedy for discovering the whereabouts of a persons or clarifying whether a situation that 31 Cf. Case of Tibi, supra note 20, para. 131; Case of the 19 Tradesmen, supra note 15, para. 193; and Case of Maritza Urrutia, supra note 19, para. 117. 32 Cf. Case of Carpio Nicolle et al., supra note 3, paras. 78 and 82(f); Case of the 19 Tradesmen, supra note 15, para. 193; and Case of Maritza Urrutia, supra note 19, para. 119. 33 Cf. Case of the 19 Tradesmen, supra note 15, para. 194; Case of Las Palmeras, supra note 25, para. 60; and Case of Godínez Cruz. Preliminary objections. Judgment of June 26, 1987. Series C No. 3, para. 93. 34 Cf. Case of the Gómez Paquiyauri Brothers, supra note 10, para. 97; Case of Juan Humberto Sánchez, supra note 21, para. 122; and Case of Bámaca Velásquez, supra note 21, para. 192.