36. It is not appropriate at this stage of the proceeding to verify if there has been any violation of the American Convention. For purposes of admissibility, the IACHR must simply determine if the arguments set out in the petition could tend to establish a violation of the American Convention, as required under Article 47(b) thereof, and whether or not the petition is "manifestly groundless" or "obviously out of order," as paragraph (c) of the same Article provides. The standard by which to assess these extremes is different from the one needed to decide the merits of a petition. At this stage the IACHR must perform a prima facie evaluation that does not imply any prejudgment or advance opinion on the merits of the petition. By establishing two clearly separate phases -one for admissibility and the other for the merits- the Commission's own Rules of Procedure reflect the distinction between the evaluation the Commission must make to declare a petition admissible, and the evaluation required to determine the responsibility of the State. 37. The petitioners claim that their dismissal violates several provisions contained in the American Convention, including those that guarantee a fair trial, effective judicial protection, and the principle of legality. 38. The allegations, which include the dismissal of the members of the Supreme Court without a hearing and in a proceeding not provided for in that country's Constitution, if proven, would constitute violations of the victims’ right to judicial protection in the framework of a proceeding with due legal guarantees as envisaged in Articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention. Furthermore, the Commission must take into consideration the decision of the Inter-American Court in the cases of Baena and Canese with respect to the application of Article 9 of the American Convention, all in connection with Article 1(1) of the aforesaid international instrument: It is desirable to analyze whether Article 9 of the Convention is applicable to the administrative punitive action, in addition to it’s being evidently applicable in the penal realm. The terms used in such precept seem to refer exclusively to the latter. However, it is appropriate to take into account that administrative sanctions, as well as penal sanctions, constitute an expression of the State’s punitive power and that, on occasions, the nature of the former is similar to that of the latter. Both, the former and the latter, imply reduction, deprivation or alteration of the rights of individuals, as a consequence of unlawful conduct. Therefore, in a democratic system it is necessary to intensify precautions in order for such measures to be adopted with absolute respect for the basic rights of individuals, and subject to a careful verification of whether or not there was unlawful conduct. Likewise, and for the sake of legal security, it is indispensable for the punitive rule, whether of a penal or an administrative nature, to exist and to be known or to offer the possibility to be known, before the action or omission that violate it and for which punishment is intended, occurs. The definition of an act as an unlawful act, and the determination of its legal effects must precede the conduct of the subject being regarded as a violator. Otherwise, individuals would not be able to orient their behavior according to a valid and true legal order within which social reproach and its consequences were expressed. These are the foundations of the principles of legality and unfavorable nonretroactivity of a punitive rule.10 39. The Commission considers that, if it were proven that the magistrates were ceased in application of a cause not provided for in the internal legislation and by an institution that was not competent to do so, there could be a violation of Article 9 of the American Convention. All of the above would be in connection with Articles 1(1) and 2 of the mentioned international instrument. 40. Furthermore, the petitioners charged that the State has violated their rights to participate in government guaranteed in Article 23(1)(c) since they consider that they were unlawfully and abruptly prevented from exercising the functions for which they were appointed on an 10 I/A Court H.R., Case of Baena-Ricardo et al. Judgment of February 2, 2001. Series C No. 72. para. 106; and Case of Ricardo Canese. Judgment of August 31, 2004. Series C No. 111. paras. 176 y 177. 9