issued; it established the procedural inadmissibility of the constitutional amparo action aimed at mounting a direct or indirect challenge to the effects of the application of Decree-Law No. 25492. 7. Petitioner further notes that on March 10, 2001, Law No. 27433 was published, derogating Decree-Law No. 25492 and ordering the reinstatement of the judges of the Judicial Branch and the Attorney General’s Office (Ministerio Público) dismissed after April 5, 1992. He alleges that despite that order the state authorities obstructed the reinstatement of the victims. Accordingly, he notes that the Executive Council of the Judicial Branch handed down Administrative Resolution No. 030-2003-CE-PJ of March 31, 2003, ordering that the chief judges of the Superior Courts of Justice should refer all applications for reinstatement to the National Judicial Council, for it to rule on them, including those that had already been carried out. He specifies that on May 22, 2003 the National Judicial Council published Resolution No. 037-2003-PCNM of May 19, 2003, by which it found inadmissible the 202 applications for reinstatement filed by dismissed judges, including his own. 8. He asserts that in tandem the Constitutional Court, by constitutional judgment of March 13, 2003, found Articles 3 and 4 of Law No. 27433 unconstitutional, as it considered that those provisions that required the judges and prosecutors unconstitutionally removed from their positions to pass an exam given by the National Judicial Council violated rights and went beyond the established powers of that institution. 9. He notes that despite the impossibility of filing the amparo action, described above, on August 7, 1992 the alleged victim filed an amparo action before the Third Civil Chamber of the Superior Court of Justice of Lima, which was found inadmissible on March 17, 1993, alleging that the aforementioned Decree Laws were binding. He states that the appellate court vacated the judgment for failure to notify all the respondents. He states that after a change in the judicial organization that drew the process out for four years, his case was referred to the Court of First Instance, which on June 5, 2001 found his amparo action unfounded on the grounds that any violation of rights had ended with the issuance of Law No. 27433 and that there was no longer any matter in dispute. He explains that in a new delay maneuver no higher-ranking chamber considered that it had jurisdiction to review the decision of first instance. He indicates that it was not until November 29, 2002 that the Third Civil Chamber of the Superior Court of Lima vacated the judgment ordering the judge below to rule on the merits of the action. He indicates that on June 16, 2003, the 64th Court Specialized in Civil Matters of Lima ruled favorably on his amparo action regarding his dismissal, ordering that he immediately be reinstated as principal judge, yet it considered his claim for recognition of salary not received to be unfounded. He states that after an appeal that decision was upheld on October 21, 2003 by the Third Civil Chamber of Lima, and that his reinstatement was effective as of March 2, 2004. He adds that even though after 12 years he was able to be reinstated to his judicial position, the state authorities denied him his accrued salaries and other labor benefits. 10. In response to this situation, he states that he filed an action for damages on May 26, 2008, which was resolved in the first instance in 2014; the decision recognized the harm caused him, and ordered the payment of compensation. He indicates that said judgment was affirmed in 2016. Nonetheless, he states that “to date the State has not given any sign or indication of interest whatsoever that evinces its willingness to honor the reparation imposed with the judgment.” In that regard, he alleges that said decision has not been informed in its own terms and within a reasonable time, thus violating his right to judicial protection provided for at Article 25(2) of the American Convention. 11. He further clarifies that he filed an action for failure to pay remuneration called “operating costs” that was resolved in his favor in 2015. Nonetheless, he asserts that that proceeding is not related to the instant petition in any way, for the claims in the two cases are manifestly different. Without prejudice to the foregoing he notes that the payment ordered in the context of that proceeding is being made capriciously. 12. Petitioner states that Decree-Law No. 25492 violated the principle of legality for it determined the removal of the alleged victim without it being provided for as a sanction in any statutory or constitutional provision in force. He further indicates that Decree-Law No. 25496 was applied retroactively, as the prohibition of a constitutional remedy set out therein was not in force as of the date of his arbitrary dismissal. The petitioner states, in addition to the economic harm that he was caused by his arbitrary removal the thenPresident of the Republic said that the judges who had been removed were corrupted or had ties to political 2