17. The Court has verified that Mrs. Barbani and Mrs. Breccia are not the representatives of the three victims who they are asking the Court to exclude by means of this request for interpretation. In the proceedings on this case before the Court, the Commission included these three individuals as presumed victims in its application and represented them.8 In its observations on the request for interpretation, the Inter-American Commission indicated that, regarding the victim Martha Moreira, it did “not have any other information […] to determine whether or not [Marta Moreira included as a victim in its application and the person called Martha Moreira who obtained a favorable opinion from the Advisory Committee of the Directors of the Central Bank] are the same person.” Regarding the victim Rafael Lena, the Commission also indicated that it did “not have any other information” than that provided by the State in its answer to the application, to the effect that the said victim “made a ‘deal’ with the Peirano Basso brothers.” Lastly, regarding the third victim, it observed that the first names of the individuals indicated as victims in the judgment differ from José Pedro Santiesteban, “so that it would appear that it is not the same person”; nevertheless, it indicated that “it did not have any other information in this regard.” 18. The Court finds that the purpose of the request submitted by Mrs. Barbani and Mrs. Breccia is not for the Court to clarify the meaning or scope of some aspect of the judgment, but seeks that the Court modify the terms of its decision concerning the determination of the victims of the violation of the right to be heard, protected under Article 8(1) of the American Convention. In addition, the Court underlines that Mrs. Barbani and Mrs. Breccia did not represent before the Court the three victims they seek to exclude in the instant case (supra para. 17). 19. The Court also considers that the grounds for declaring the said violation and the criteria based on which it declared 539 persons as victims are clearly established in paragraphs 133 to 147 of the judgment. 20. In this regard, the Court finds it pertinent to recall that, in its judgment, it concluded that Uruguay had violated the right to be heard, protected under Article 8(1) of the American Convention, to the detriment of 539 persons who had filed petitions under the special procedure established by article 31 of Law 17,613 that were rejected by the Uruguayan Central Bank. The Court considered that the violation occurred because the Central Bank made an incomplete analysis of the third requirement established in the said article 31, which had a direct impact on the decision of whether or not to accept the petitions9 This article 31 granted two rights to those who met the requirements established in the said law: (i) recognition as a creditor of the Banco de Montevideo or of the Banco La 8 When notifying the Commission’s application to the State and to the representatives, the parties were informed that, in accordance with the provisions of Article 34(3) of the Court’s previous Rules of Procedure, applicable to this case as provided for in Article 79(2) of the current Rules of Procedure, “the Commission, in its capacity as guarantor of the public interest under the American Convention, shall represent the alleged victims [who do not have a duly accredited legal representative] in the proceedings in order to ensure that they enjoy legal defense.” 9 The said article 31 authorized the Central Bank to grant to the depositors of the Banco de Montevideo and the Banco La Caja Obrera the same rights as the law provided to those “depositors” “whose deposits had been transferred to other institutions” “without their consent.” According to the decisions issued by the Board of the Central Bank and the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal of Uruguay, this law called for concurrent compliance with all three requirements. This Court determined that the Central Bank of Uruguay had made an incomplete examination of the merits of the petitions of the 539 victims, under the special procedure of article 31, because it did not make a comprehensive examination of the element of consent, and this had affected the determination of the rights granted by article 31. The Court verified that the above-mentioned administrative body decided to examine only the elements from which consent could be inferred, but expressly inhibited itself from analyzing the arguments and evidence that could affect or invalidate consent. Cf. Case of Barbani Duarte et al. v. Uruguay. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of October 13, 2011. Series C No. 234, paras. 77, 93, 125, 136, 141, 142 and 232 and first operative paragraph. 5