wardens of the center expressed their concern about "the continuous absences of the (Male) Police Agent during weekends and also on weekdays."15 22. In a post-event statement, the former Warden acknowledged that the center "does not have the infrastructure to maintain a population of fifty to seventy adolescents and despite [LOPNA] entering into force five years ago, this center lacks the conditions to function; also on that day as at other times, there was no police support, no security at the center and few personnel"16. He also stated that having only two guides per shift was usual, despite the high population of the center.17 23. Regarding overcrowding, although the center had capacity to house 30 youths,18 throughout 2004 and 2005, a population averaging 75 to 90 youths was reported,19 and on one occasion up to 105 inmates. 20 At the date of the fire, the center housed approximately 50 youths. 21 It should be noted that the alleged victims’ cell had four concrete beds, 22 but on the day of the events it housed seven youths, two of whom were released minutes before the fire. The Warden acknowledged months before that the situation of overcrowding "could endanger the physical integrity of the [young inmates]."23 The case file also shows that in the center only “those who reached the age of majority were separated [from other inmates], but not those in pretrial detention and those sentenced," because such separation “was not foreseen in the design [of the establishment].“24 24. The lack of effective control on the entry of unauthorized items into the center is also documented. In 2004, the then-Warden requested the assignment of a (female) police officer to the center to carry out searches of the mothers who entered the center during visiting hours.25 It is clear from the case file that this request was not satisfied, as security recommendations issued by the National Guard after the fire insist on the need for such controls. 26 Center staff also reported that inmates' families brought them, for example, lighters and cigarettes.27 25. Regarding the infrastructure, the facilities did not have sufficient electricity and lighting services.28 The expert witness’ opinion carried out by the CICPC after the events concluded that "the building does not have detection systems or fire alarms in any of the areas. It was noted that cell no. 4 did not have an internal electricity supply. The lighting in this and other dormitories is provided only by lamps located in the corridors."29 There was also information that "the young inmates improvised wiring to have electricity inside the cell, but after the fire it was removed."30 In this sense, weeks after the fire, the National Guard recommended the "revision and exhaustive repair of electrical installations."31 The absence of a system of fire alarms and Annex 8. Letter of Nerio Romero to Rafael Martínez, Temporary Enforcement Judge (9.10.2004). Annex 01 to the additional brief; see also Annex 9. Letter Nerio Romero to Arquímedes Viamonte Carpio, Chief of Police (9.10.2004). Annex 11 to the additional brief; Annex 10. Inspection Report of the INAM-San Félix (21.4.2005). Annex 07 to the additional brief; Annex 11. Statement of Fanny Ricardo (5.8.2005). Annex 02 to the additional brief. 16 Annex 12. Statement of Nerio Romero (7.29.2005). Annex 28 to the additional brief. 17 Annex 12. Statement of Nerio Romero (7.29.2005). Annex 28 to the additional brief; see also Annex 13. Interview of Brígida Hurtado (8.7.2005). Annex 29 to the additional brief. 18 Annex 11. Statement of Fanny Ricardo (5.8.2005). Annex 02 to the additional brief. 19 See Annexes 8 and 9. 20 Annex 11. Statement of Fanny Ricardo (5.8.2005). Annex 02 to the additional brief. 21 Annex 10. Inspection Report of the INAM-San Félix (21.4.2005). Annex 07 to the additional brief; Annex 14. Inmate list of INAM-San Félix, April 2005. Annex 09 to the additional brief. 22 Annex 15. Report of the Criminal Toxicological Laboratory (1.7.2005). Annex 51 to the additional brief. 23 Annex 8. Letter of Nerio Romero to Rafael Martínez, Temporary Enforcement Judge (9.10.2004). Annex 01 to the additional brief. 24 Annex 10. Inspection Report of the INAM-San Félix (21.4.2005). Annex 07 to the additional brief. 25 Annex 16. Letter of José Gregorio Arteaga, Director of the INAM-San Félix, to Hernán Bogarín, General Inspector IPOL Bolívar, (12.5.2004). Annex 10 to the additional brief. 26 Annex 17. Letter of Luis López, Commander of the National Guard, to Franklin Rojas, Prosecutor (19.8.2005). Annex D to the original petition. 27 See, for example, Annex 13. Interview of Brígida Hurtado (8.7.2005). Annex 29 to the additional brief. 28 Annex 10. Inspection Report of the INAM-San Félix (21.4.2005). Annex 07 to the additional brief; Annex 18. Report of the National Council for the Rights of the Child and Adolescents, July 2005. Annex P to the original petition. 29 Annex 19. CICPC Expert Report (31.8.2005). Annex 18 to the additional brief. 30 Annex 20. Interview of Carlos Martes (3.8.2005). Annex 15 to the additional brief. 31 Annex 17. Letter of Luis López, Commander of the National Guard, to Franklin Rojas, Prosecutor (19.8.2005). Annex D to the original petition. 15