For purposes of admissibility, the standard of analysis used for the prima facie assessment of the adequacy and effectiveness of the remedies under domestic law is not as high as the one required to determine whether a violation of Convention-protected rights has been committed. 27. To determine whether a remedy is “adequate” and, by extension, whether there is a probability that relief for the violations claimed by the alleged victim will be granted, the Commission must examine whether that remedy is set forth in the domestic laws in such a way that it can be used to remedy the violations being alleged. Here, the IACHR need not determine a priori whether the allegations have any foundation or can be characterized as or constitute violations of the Convention. Instead, it has to assume that probability, albeit on a strictly provisional basis, as a kind of working hypothesis. Using this criterion, the Commission must determine whether one or more of the remedies mentioned is or are relevant for purposes of Article 46(1)(a) of the Convention, 12 and whether there is some special circumstance present that would exempt the alleged victim from having to exhaust those remedies.13 When examining the exception provided for in Article 46(2)(b) of the Convention, where the domestic laws make no provision for due process to protect the right allegedly violated,14 the standard for the prima facie assessment of whether such remedy exists is not 12 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has ruled that adequate domestic remedies are those “which are suitable to address an infringement of a legal right. A number of remedies exist in the legal system of every country, but not all are applicable in every circumstance. If a remedy is not adequate in a specific case, it obviously need not be exhausted. A norm is meant to have an effect and should not be interpreted in such a way as to negate its effect or lead to a result that is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.” Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Velásquez Rodríquez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988, Series C Nº 4, paragraphs 63 and 64. Godínez Cruz Case, Judgment of January 20, 1989, Series C Nº 5, paragraphs 66 and 67; Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales Case, Judgment of March 15, 1989, Series C Nº 6, paragraphs 87 and 88; Caballero Delgado y Santana Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of January 21, 1994, Series C No.17, par. 63;Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies (Art. 46(1), 46(2)(a) and 46(2)(b) American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-11/90 of August 10, 1990, Series A Nº 11, par. 36. As an example of an “inadequate” remedy, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has expressly stated that “a civil proceeding specifically cited by the Government, such as a presumptive finding of death based on disappearance, the purpose of which is to allow heirs to dispose of the estate of the person presumed deceased or to allow the spouse to remarry, is not an adequate remedy for finding a person or for obtaining his liberty.” See: Velásquez Rodríquez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988, Series C Nº 4, paragraph 64. The IACHR has stated that certain remedies are not “adequate” to remedy the violations being alleged. In Report Nº 71/00, case 11.676,”X” and “Z”, Argentina, decision of October 3, 2000, par. 31, the Commission stated that “with regard to the complaints that the petitioner filed in criminal court, the IACHR notes that they referred to the possibly criminal conduct on the part of public officials [and] would not have constituted a remedy for the alleged violations having to do with her daughter’s return to Spain.” In Report Nº 57/00, Case 12.050, La Granja, Ituango, Colombia, decision of October 2, 2000, par. 41, the Commission stated that “disciplinary proceedings do not meet the obligations established by the Convention in the area of judicial protection, since they are not an effective and sufficient means for prosecuting, punishing, and making reparation for the consequences of the extrajudicial execution of persons protected by the Convention. Therefore, in the context of this case, the disciplinary measures cannot be considered remedies that must be exhausted under Article 46(1). As regards exhaustion of the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, the Commission has already indicated that this type of proceeding is exclusively a mechanism for supervising the administrative activity of the State aimed at obtaining compensation for damages caused by the abuse of authority.” (Report Nº 15/95, Annual Report of the IACHR 1995, par. 71; Report Nº 61/99, Annual Report of the IACHR 1999, par. 51). “In general, this process is not an adequate mechanism, on its own, to make reparation for human rights violations; consequently, it is not necessary for it to be exhausted when, as in this case, there is another means for securing both reparation for the harm done and the prosecution and punishment demanded.” (Report Nº 5/98, case 11.019, Alvaro Moreno Moreno, Annual Report of the IACHR 1997, par. 61). 13 On the matter of the efficacy of the remedies, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has ruled as follows: “A remedy must also be effective – that is, capable of producing the result for which it was designed.” On the other hand, the mere fact that a “remedy does not produce a result favorable to the petitioner does not in and of itself demonstrate the inexistence or exhaustion of all effective domestic remedies. For example, the petitioner may not have invoked the appropriate remedy in a timely fashion. It is a different matter, however, when it is shown that remedies are denied for trivial reasons or without an examination of the merits (…) In such cases, resort to those remedies becomes a senseless formality. The exceptions of Article 46(2) would be fully applicable in those situations and would discharge the obligation to exhaust internal remedies since they cannot fulfill their objective in that case.” See: Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988, Series C Nº 4,paragraphs 66-68; Godínez Cruz Case, Judgment of January 20, 1989, Series 1989, Series C Nº 5, paragraphs 69-71; Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales Case, Judgment of March 15, 1989, Series C No.6, paragraphs 91-93; Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies (Art. 46(1), 46(2)(a) and 46(2)(b) American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-11/90 of August 10, 1990, Series A Nº 11, paragraphs 34-36. In these rulings, the Court has cited the following as an example of the “inefficacy” of remedies: “Procedural requirements can make the remedy of habeas corpus ineffective, if it is powerless to compel the authorities.” 14 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has ruled as follows: “Article 46(2)(a) applies to situations in which the domestic law of a State Party does not provide appropriate remedies to protect rights that have been violated (…) These provisions thus apply to situations where domestic remedies cannot be exhausted because they are not available either as a matter of law or as a matter of fact.” See: Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Exceptions to 7