determination is very much to the purpose of the system for the international protection of rights since otherwise the rule of prior exhaustion would invariably detain or delay any proceeding on the victim’s behalf to the point that it became futile. That is why Article 46(2) of the Convention establishes exceptions to the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies, precisely in situations where, for various reasons, those remedies are ineffective or inadequate. The practice of the Commission and of other international organizations for the protection of human rights confirms that the timing of the decision on the exceptions to the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies depends upon the circumstances of each specific case. Where the decision on the admissibility of the present case is concerned, the Commission sees no reason why its analysis of the rule requiring exhaustion of remedies under domestic law and the exceptions to it should be postponed until a later stage in the process, such as when the merits of the case are examined.17 30. As for the distribution of the burden of proof for establishing whether the rule requiring exhaustion of local remedies has been met, the Commission reiterates that a State alleging non-exhaustion has an obligation to prove that domestic remedies remain to be exhausted and that they are effective.18 If the State alleging the failure to exhaust local remedies proves that there are domestic remedies that should have been used, the petitioners will have to show that those remedies were exhausted or that one of the exceptions provided for in Article 46(2) of the Convention obtains. The Inter-American Court has ruled that “It must not be rashly presumed that a State Party to the Convention has failed to comply with its obligation to provide effective remedies.”19 31. In the instant case, the petitioner alleges that under the exception provided for in Article 46(2)(c) of the Convention, he is exempt from the rule requiring exhaustion of local remedies because of procedural delays in the following: a) the case prosecuting the petitioner’s unlawful treatment; b) the case prosecuting the unlawful deprivation of liberty of the petitioner;20 and c) the case in which the petitioner, Juan Carlos Bayarri, is charged with various crimes. The State notes that the remedies under domestic law have not been exhausted in any of these cases. It argues that the first two are still in progress, and that the delay in the third case is justified on several counts. On December 5, 2000, the State alleged that the petitioner had not filed the remedies that domestic law affords. Thus, even though this case was instituted in 1994, it was not until December 2000 that the State alleged the petitioner’s a failure to file the petition of complaint to challenge the courts’ delay in rendering a final judgment. Also, while the most recent petition for release was exhausted in 1997 with the ruling of the Appellate Chamber, it was only then that the State brought up the failure to exhaust the extraordinary appeals. The State’s reference to those remedies is vague. It neither cites the specific applicable norms nor defends the adequacy and effectiveness of those remedies under domestic law. The IACHR will now examine whether the petitioner met the requirement stipulated in Article 46(1)(a) or if the exceptions provided for in Article 46(2) of the Convention apply. 17 In the Velásquez Rodríguez case (cited above, paragraph 95) the Inter-American Court of Human Rights decided to postpone consideration of the arguments on the exceptions to the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies until it examined the merits of the case in order,inter alia, to receive the parties’ evidence and hear their arguments. 18 The Court has repeatedly held that “the State claiming non-exhaustion has an obligation to prove that domestic remedies remain to be exhausted and that they are effective.” See: Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of June 26, 1987, Series C Nº 1, par. 88; Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of June 26, 1987, Series C Nº 2, par. 8; Godínez Cruz Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of June 26, 1987, Series C Nº 3, par. 90; Gangaram Panday Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of December 4, 1991, Series C No.12, par. 38; Neira Alegría et al. Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of December 11, 1991, Series C No.13, par. 30; Castillo Páez Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of January 30, 1996, Series C Nº 24, par. 40; Loayza Tamayo Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of January 31, 1996, Series C Nº 25, par. 40; Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies (Art. 46(1), 46(2)(a) and 46(2)(b) American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-11/90 of August 10, 1990, Series A No.11, par. 41. 19 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988, Series C No 4, paragraphs 59 and 60; Godínez Cruz Case, Judgment of January 20, 1989, Series C Nº 5, paragraphs 62 and 63; Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales Case, Judgment of March 15, 1989, Series C Nº 6, paragraphs 83 and 84; Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies (Art. 46(1), 46(2)(a) and 46(2)(b) American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-11/90 of August 10, 1990, Series A Nº 11, par. 41. 20 The State alleged that the case is continuing by order of the judge; because of a number of procedural defects, there was no one in the role of injured party. The State is citing Article 87 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Province of Buenos Aires. 9